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ABSTRACT 
 
The experiences of the United States Armed Forces of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War resulted a new term to surface called 
“hybrid warfare”.  It was to describe the complexity of today’s battlefield.  The term “hy-
brid warfare” was never officially defined nor is it today.  The updated version of the US 
ARMY Field Manual 3-0: Operations (Change 1) from February 22, 2011, introduced and 
defined “hybrid threat” and thus opened the discussion for hybrid adversary.  
 
In this thesis a model is introduced according to which any organization, group or an ad-
versary can be examined and evaluated to see whether it qualifies as a hybrid adversary.    
It is demonstrated by the example of Hezbollah, which is recognized as the best example of 
an organization utilizing “hybrid warfare” and subsequently categorizing as a hybrid adver-
sary.  The model will be tested with Afghan Taliban to see whether both the model works 
and Taliban qualifies as a hybrid adversary or not. 
 
According to the model used in this thesis, it is concluded that Taliban does not meet the 
standards of a hybrid adversary, but with acquisition of standoff weapons it would quickly 
qualify as one.  The model proved to work, and it could be used as a tool by intelligence of-
ficers for estimating the threat levels of any group or identifying those groups that are al-
ready or are about to develop into a hybrid adversary. 
 
KEY WORDS 
Hybrid warfare, hybrid threat, hybrid adversary, Hezbollah, Taliban, Second Lebanon War, 
Lebanon, Afghanistan, modified model of identifying a hybrid adversary.  
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HEZBOLLAH AND TALIBAN – Hybrid Adversaries in Contemporary 
Conflicts 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Recognizing threats and potential adversaries play a key role in any conflict, whether it’s a 
state against a state conflict or a state against a group conflict.  In this thesis the issue of an 
adversary is discussed from the American point of view and how to determine the level of 
threat this particular adversary poses.  This will be done within the context of hybrid threat 
and hybrid warfare by using a model according to which any organization or group can be 
evaluated and its threat level estimated.  This model will be demonstrated by using Hezbollah 
and tested on Taliban – both organizations involved in contemporary conflicts and wars since 
beginning of the 21
st
 century.   
As President Barack Obama begins his second term as the President of the United States of 
America, the United States Armed Forces are facing some fundamental changes on the doctri-
nal level in the forthcoming decade.  The Department of Defense’s January, 2012, strategic 
guidance document “Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century De-
fense” outlines key military missions for which the Department of Defense (DOD) will pre-
pare for and thus it gives the guidelines for the development and priorities for the United 
States Armed Forces to reach the desired state of Joint Forces 2020.  The US Armed Forces 
will be reduced in size and curtailed from the capability of fighting two simultaneous large 
scale wars to one while “denying the objectives or imposing unacceptable costs on an oppor-
tunistic aggressor in another region”.  The overall focus will be shifting towards the Asia-
Pacific region to balance the influence projected by China as an emerging regional power.    
The focus is shifting from the AirLand Battle Concept to the AirSea Battle Concept to face the 
demands for the military in the Asia-Pacific region.  Facing counterinsurgency (COIN) opera-
tions, such as faced in Afghanistan and Iraq, will no longer play as important of a role for the 
US military as they did during the last decade, but rather the importance of more conventional 
force on force battle is reinstated.  The change of focus from AirLand Battle Concept dimin-
ishes the role of the US Army, which thus faces reductions in manpower along with budget 
cuts in the future, and forces it to evaluate its overall role in the AirSea Concept in general.
1
 
After waging two long wars for over a decade in Afghanistan and Iraq, the weariness and frus-
tration can be seen in the role the Americans are taking in global politics today.  It is pulling 
                                                 
1
 Department of Defense: Sustaining of U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21
st
 Century Defense, January 
2012, pp. 1-2, 4; Scaife, Robert B.: The Regularity of Irregular Warfare, Small Wars Journal, October 16, 2012, 
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back and allowing, or rather letting its allies take an active role in regional conflicts.  This can 
be seen in Libya and Mali.  The Libyan campaign (2011) was carried out primarily by few Eu-
ropean NATO countries, because it was in the interests of those countries to deal with it, yet 
strong military and political support in the background was provided by the U.S.   The Mali 
campaign (2013) is carried out by the French, since France, as an old colonial power, still has 
many economic interests within the region.  Basically the U.S. has no interest to police around 
the world any more on behalf of other nations to the extent it has done for the last two decades 
since the Gulf War (1990-1991) – unless it is in its direct interests to do so.  Also this lack of 
interest to take a leading role in military operations, contrary to the past, demonstrates the cau-
tiousness of the United States to get involved in a conflict to begin with; additionally it has no 
interests whatsoever to get involved in a conflict that could evolve into a hard-to-win insur-
gency for an unknown, extended period of time.  As a proof of this, we can look at Mali.  In-
stead of being sucked into an unpredictable military conflict against spinoff terrorist group of 
al-Qaeda, the U.S. politicians are more concerned of the domestic economic issues and the 
fiscal cliff, and let the French take a leading role in it.
2
 
This new approach of the U.S. is creating challenges to its Western allies (i.e. NATO and Eu-
ropean countries etc.).  European NATO countries and EU member countries have continu-
ously reduced the size of their militaries for over the last 20 years.  In the future, when the 
U.S. is pulling out of Europe, they need to take more responsibility for their defense and the 
development of the capabilities of their defense forces than they are accustomed to.  These 
countries have relied strongly on the U.S. military power, presence, assistance and proactivity 
in using military power, which will no longer be a given, permanent status – they have to 
change from security consumers to security providers.  This also means that Europe for that 
matter has to take more responsibility for the security within its boundaries and areas of inter-
ests.  Yet according to the Department of Defense strategic guideline document of 2012, the 
U.S. is not withdrawing its support and will uphold its military commitments to Europe pro-
vided that there is a need for it.  This can be done with more mobile and capable forces that 
don’t need to be located permanently in Europe.  This shift of balance in the thinking of the 
Western actors in the global security politics may distance these actors from each other, and 
that could create challenges in the future, if the Europeans feel the U.S. really isn’t giving the 
support it’s expected to give. 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-regularity-of-irregular-warfare, accessed 22.1.2013. 
2
 Friedman, George: Avoiding the Wars That Never End, Stratfor, Global Intelligence, January 15, 2013, 
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/avoiding-wars-never-end, accessed 21.1.2013; Daley, Jane: For President 
Obama, al-Qaeda is our problem now, The Telegraph, January 19, 2013,  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/algeria/9812783/For-President-Obama-al-
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The current stance of the US Armed Forces towards insurgencies and irregular warfare can be 
described as “unnecessary”, meaning it is unnecessary to focus on them, because the next war 
will be fought against an enemy equipped alike, a peer against peer or state against state or a 
conventional war.  Is that so?  Western militaries and especially the US Armed Forces, while 
equipping themselves with the most effective technology and weapons, set conventions how 
to wage war using these effective means.  The adversaries will not be able to fight effectively 
against a western military applying by the same rules and means of warfare as the western 
militaries do; they will not abide by these conventions (rules of war, Geneva Conventions etc.)  
To be effective they circumvent these rules of war.   In a conflict where a state is facing a 
group, the group is considered an underdog, and it is expected to bend these conventions or 
even disregard them entirely.  This creates a situation where the state is not fighting against a 
similarly equipped and behaving “regular” adversary, but rather an “irregular” one.  The ene-
my will use any method available to defeat the western technological superiority, thus making 
irregular warfare something – kind of a hybrid – that should not be forgotten as obsolete, or 
counterinsurgency for that matter either.  Irregular wars tend to extend in length and may even 
turn into insurgencies at some point.  Furthermore, it can be argued that the Western countries 
in Europe and North America will be facing this issue while dealing with radical Islam in the 
Middle East, Africa or even Europe, as we’ve seen very recently:  The French made a pre-
emptive strike in Mali preventing a radical Islamist group taking over power and control in the 
area.  A spinoff al-Qaeda group al-Mulathanim (“the Masked Ones”) took over 700 hostages 
in an Algerian gas field and was annihilated by an Algerian army military operation.  Had 
there been more American hostages, the American response can only be speculated.  How to 
deal with the already existing radical Islamist groups or the emerging breakaway groups?  
Which and where is the next group?  How to make an estimate which group will pose a poten-
tial threat in the future, and how will that threat be dealt with?  Due to the lack of uniform ap-
proach by the West, these questions remain unanswered.
3
 
1.1 Hybrid Warfare 
The military conflicts the western militaries have been involved with during the first decade of 
the 21
st
 century turned out to develop in a manner that forced them to reconsider their ap-
proaches to handle such conflicts.  The Iraq War in (2003-2011) and the campaign in Afghan-
istan (2001- up to date) initially represented military theories such as Revolution in Military 
                                                                                                                                                        
Qaeda-is-our-problem-now.html, accessed 22.1.2013 
3
 Scaife; d’Ancona, Matthew: David Cameron had to tackle the future before the past, The Telegraph, January, 
19, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/9812782/David-Cameron-had-to-tackle-the-
future-before-the-past.html, accessed 22.1.2013. 
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Affairs (RMA) and were operationally well executed to the point that the countries were oc-
cupied and the opposing force defeated.  The use of large numbers of troops and technological 
advantage gave the western militaries superiority over their adversaries as expected in the doc-
trines of the time.  The aftermath of both campaigns surprised the victors and was anything 
but “a mission accomplished and problem solved”, having an irrelevant strategic end state 
posed a problem – having the opposing force was neutralized, territory occupied and Saddam 
Hussein overthrown, what next?   
In both countries, in Iraq and in Afghanistan, the coalition was not prepared for nation build-
ing.  The coalition forces were unable to provide the defeated nations and populations with 
political stability, local security and economic development.  These are all important factors in 
gaining the respect and confidence of the residents of territories occupied and fundamental el-
ements to carry out successfully the reconstruction phase of an operation.  As a result in both 
countries coalition forces became involved in insurgencies – something they were not pre-
pared to tackle.  In these insurgencies, the different groups the coalition forces faced had dif-
ferent ethnic, political, religious, criminal, or even terrorist agendas.  They were ready to use 
any methods to meet their conflicting goals, even use extreme violence.  Their modus operan-
di included “advanced conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and disruptive 
technologies or criminality.”4 
The changing nature of conflicts, the complexity and multimodality, brought up the need to 
understand better these conflicts the western militaries were involved with.  To understand 
better what was going on, a new descriptive word was brought into the discussion – “hybrid”, 
eventually leading to a new term in warfare: “hybrid warfare”.  It could be described “as a 
cocktail of conventional military capabilities, insurgencies, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, or-
ganized crime, cyber warfare and advanced military technology.  This kind of warfare may 
also include violations of international laws of war, and will often also include non-state ac-
tors and organizations, supported by states with dubious agendas.  All these ingredients may 
be blended together with an equivocal number of ingredients affecting the outcome at the 
same time.  The magnitude of each ingredient may vary significantly during the war depend-
ing on the phase of the war or its immediate effectiveness.”5 
                                                 
4
 Wilkie, Robert: Hybrid Warfare; Something Old, Not Something New, Air&Space Power Journal, Winter 
2009, volume XXIII, No. 4 ARFP 10-1, 
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/win09/wilkie.html, 25.3.2011. 
5
 Huovinen, Kari-Petri Oskari: HYBRID WARFARE – Just a Twist of Compound Warfare?, National Defense 
University, Helsinki, 2011, p. 3. 
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While the Americans were fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan in the rapidly changing operation-
al environment, they were not the only ones facing startling adversaries in the battle field.  The 
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was overtaken by the methods and capabilities of Hezbollah dur-
ing their Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006.  Hezbollah’s military capabilities and 
ability to adapt to the changing environment was underestimated by the IDF.  They were not 
facing just a poorly organized paramilitary wing of a terrorist organization, but rather a highly 
motivated, well trained and equipped force with weapons usually seen in the arsenal of nation 
states, such as advanced anti-tank weapons and long-, mid- and short-range missiles.
6
  The 
Second Lebanon War is considered the best example of hybrid warfare hitherto. 
The debate about this unofficial new form of warfare, hybrid warfare, was carried out during 
the first decade of the 21
st
 century in a number of western military publications, eventually 
leading to the need for an official statement on the issue.  The United States Government Ac-
countability Office (GAO)
7
 published a study named “Hybrid Warfare” in September 2010 
and with that study it tried to put an end to the discussion about hybrid warfare being a new 
form of warfare.  According to that document, the U.S. Armed Forces were abandoning the 
term, since according to GAO, in different branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, hybrid warfare 
was included in the already existing term full spectrum operations, and was also included in 
the existing doctrines on traditional and irregular warfare.  Hence GAO concluded hybrid war-
fare was not to be considered a new form of warfare.  Because of that GAO-report there was a 
possibility that the term would disappear from the official doctrines, field manuals and discus-
sion of the U.S. Armed Forces and the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC)
8
 in particular within the next few years.
9
   
However, the discussion about hybrid warfare did not stop, nor did the need to re-evaluate the 
existing doctrines.  In February 22, 2011, to answer the need to learn and adapt, the U.S. Ar-
                                                 
6
 Kober, Avi: The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance?, The Journal 
of Strategic Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, 3-40, February 2008, pp. 15-16, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390701785211, accessed 1.10.2010. 
7
 The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Con-
gress. Often called the "congressional watchdog," GAO investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer 
dollars. Its mission is to support the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve 
the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. 
It provides Congress with timely information that is objective, fact-based, nonpartisan, nonideological, fair, and 
balanced.  http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html, accessed 13.11.2012. 
8
 TRADOC’s Mission: TRADOC develops the Army's Soldier and Civilian leaders, and designs, develops, and 
integrates capabilities, concepts and doctrine in order to build an Army that is a versatile mix of tailorable, adapt-
able, and networked organizations operating on a rotational cycle for Full Spectrum Operations; Support the Ar-
my’s Human Capital Core Enterprise and sustain the All-Volunteer Force.  
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/about.htm#CommandMission, accessed 10.1.2011. 
9
 United States Government Accountability Office, Hybrid Warfare, Washington, D.C., USA, September 10, 
2010, pp. 2-3. 
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my TRADOC published Change 1 of the Field Manual 3-0: “Operations” to replace the earlier 
edition from 2008.  The commanding general of the U.S. Army TRADOC, General Martin E. 
Dempsey states in the foreword of the new FM 3-0: “Operations”:  
“The future operational environment will be characterized by hybrid threats: 
combinations of regular, irregular, terrorist, and criminal groups who decen-
tralize and syndicate against us and who possess capabilities previously monop-
olized by nation states. These hybrid threats create a more competitive security 
environment, and it is for these threats we must prepare.”10 
Hybrid threat was and is now defined officially.  This was done to capture the increased com-
plexity of operations and multiplicity of actors involved in the conflicts of today.  This com-
plexity was recognized due to the experiences in Iraq and in Afghanistan, and the discussion 
carried out by military thinkers.  The emergence of a hybrid threat in the discussion brings up 
the thought of a hybrid adversary.  How could a hybrid adversary be defined and detected?  A 
hybrid threat is defined as follows:   
“A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, ir-
regular forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these forces and elements 
all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.”11  
FM 3-0: Operations, Change 1, describes the nature of a hybrid threat thus opening the door 
for the definition of a hybrid adversary. 
1.2 Research questions and Methodology 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the following primary research question: 
- Does Taliban fulfill the requirements of a hybrid adversary or is it likely to become 
one according to the modified model of identifying a hybrid adversary? 
The secondary research questions are: 
- What is the historical evolution of Hezbollah and Taliban from the perspective of the 
modified model of identifying a hybrid adversary?  
- What are the similarities and differences of Hezbollah and Taliban?  
- Does the modified model of identifying a hybrid adversary originally represented by 
Major Christopher O. Bowers (US ARMY) work with Taliban? 
                                                 
10
 Field Manual No 3-0: Operations, Change 1, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington , DC, Feb-
ruary 22, 2011. 
11
 Ibid, p. 1-5. 
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In this thesis a qualitative data analysis is used to analyze the development of Hezbollah and 
Taliban in historical context with respect to the modified model of identifying a hybrid adver-
sary.  The information regarding both organizations is based on the analysis of literature and 
other information available.  This thesis supports the so called “Sacramento Model”, which 
consists of three fundamental questions:  what, why and how?  Each question needs to be an-
swered first, before moving on to the next question.  If an answer to the question is not found, 
then one must return to the previous question and rephrase before moving on.   “What,” in this 
case being the identification of a hybrid adversary.  “Why,” because an adversary using irreg-
ular warfare is more likely of an opponent in the forthcoming conflicts of the future than a 
state using conventional warfare, and thus it would be beneficial to identify these kinds of ad-
versaries prior to engaging them or even preventing them from developing into a hybrid ad-
versary.  “How,” in this case, the identification will be done with the modified model of iden-
tifying a hybrid adversary. 
First, the nature of hybrid warfare and a hybrid adversary is demonstrated by using the Second 
Lebanon War and Hezbollah as an example; showing what kind of an adversary western mili-
taries may face in conflicts of today, since Hezbollah is considered the best example of an or-
ganization applying hybrid warfare in practice.  This part of the thesis draws heavily on the 
thesis written by the author Senior Staff Officer Course in 2011.   
Second, the modified model of identifying a hybrid adversary is introduced using Hezbollah as 
an example organization.  Then Taliban, a well-known organization of a contemporary con-
flict in Afghanistan, is presented as a case study of a potential hybrid adversary.  By compar-
ing these two organizations in the context of hybrid adversary model, the similarities and dif-
ferences of these two organizations are pointed out and conclusions drawn whether Taliban 
fits in the model or not, and how it should develop, if it was to fit in the model.  
In the last part of this thesis the research questions are answered and the applicability of this 
model to these two organizations discussed, and to Taliban in particular and to other organiza-
tions for that matter.  The reliability of this model is also pondered in the end in addition to 
the potential flaws and needed adjustments in it.  
1.3 Frame of Reference and Limitations 
In order to understand the concept of hybrid adversary and hybrid threat one must familiarize 
with the terminology around the concept of hybrid warfare.  Different types of warfare have 
been discussed and debated in the military literature over the last 30 years, such as conven-
tional warfare, irregular warfare, compound warfare, asymmetric warfare and hybrid warfare.  
12 
 
The natures of the conflicts the western militaries have been involved with during this time 
period have shaped the thoughts on warfare.   
Let us first define different types of warfare. 
Conventional warfare can be described as the kind of war two or more states wage against 
each other, using their regular forces and national armies to reach their respective political or 
military goals.  These armies fight battles and follow the rules of war, at least to some degree, 
and the warring parties expect their counterparts to abide by these rules.
12
  
Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and in-
fluence over the relevant population(s).  Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric ap-
proaches though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities in order to erode 
an adversary’s power, influence, and will.13  Irregular warfare includes acts of terrorism, in-
surgency and other unconventional methods, as well as the countermeasures for each i.e. 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.
14
   
Compound warfare is the simultaneous use of a regular or main force and an irregular or guer-
rilla force against an enemy.  In other words, the compound warfare operator increases his 
military leverage by applying both conventional and unconventional force at the same time.
15
  
It is a combination of conventional and irregular warfare, including elements of both to reach 
the common goal. 
The term asymmetric warfare describes an alternative way to fight a war, a way for a weaker 
party to counter the stronger opponent.  In asymmetric warfare the weaker party uses his own 
strengths to strike at the enemy’s characteristic weaknesses.  So-called unconventional or un-
orthodox tactics are typically included in the weaker party’s toolbox.  The approach includes 
surprise and unpredictability.  The weaker party tries to deny the stronger party of the ability 
to use his strengths and countermeasures effectively by forcing him to fight in unfavorable 
circumstances.   Asymmetric warfare can be seen to include irregular and hybrid features of 
warfare, but as a term it is not clearly defined.
16
 
                                                 
12
 Huovinen, p. 7. 
13
 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms: Joint Publication 1-02, 12 April 2001, 
amended September 30, 2010. 
14
 Huovinen, p. 7. 
15
 Huber, Thomas M.: Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 
Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2002, p. 1. 
16
 Huovinen, p. 8. 
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Hybrid warfare is well described by Rear Admiral Chris Parry (retired) of the Royal Navy in 
the text “Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach” in the following 
manner:  
“Hybrid warfare is conducted by irregular forces that have access to the more 
sophisticated weapons and systems normally fielded by regular forces.  Hybrid 
warfare may morph and adapt throughout an individual campaign, as circum-
stances and resources allow.  It is anticipated that irregular groups will contin-
ue to acquire sophisticated weapons and technologies and that intervention 
forces will need to confront a variety of threats that have in the past been asso-
ciated primarily with the regular Armed Forces of states.”17   
To make hybrid warfare more comprehensive than the other types of warfare mentioned be-
fore it is reinforced with elements of criminality and cyber warfare.  But with the term hybrid 
warfare one must be cautious how to use it, since it is expected of an adversary fighting as an 
underdog to use any means available to reach its objectives, thus making it fitting to the de-
scription mentioned above, but not necessarily an actual hybrid threat.  If everybody uses the 
methods of hybrid warfare, then everybody is hybrid or the other way around – nobody is.  
Perhaps because of this analogy, hybrid warfare should be officially defined. 
Now the different types of warfare involved in this thesis are defined.  Next let us define hy-
brid threats and from there on hybrid adversaries.  The U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0: Opera-
tions defines hybrid threats as follows: 
“A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, ir-
regular forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these forces and elements 
all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Hybrid threats combine regu-
lar forces governed by international law, military tradition, and custom with un-
regulated irregular forces that act with no restrictions on violence or their tar-
gets. These forces could include militias, terrorists, guerillas, and criminals. 
Such forces combine their abilities to use and transition between regular and ir-
regular tactics and weapons. These abilities enable hybrid threats to capitalize 
on perceived vulnerabilities making them particularly effective. ”18 
When determining the hybrid threat, the full scale of methods available and used is empha-
sized throughout the FM3-0: “Operations”.  This includes criminality, media, sophisticated 
                                                 
17
 Wilkie, p. 1. 
18
 FM 3-0: Operations, Ch 1, p. 1-5. 
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weapons, technology, command and control systems, cyber activities, use of combined arms 
tactics, and both political and social infrastructure to their advantage.  It is also recognized 
that a hybrid threat might use global networks effectively to cause global awareness for the 
conflict.
19
 
Hybrid threat has been discussed in a number of manuals, articles and academic papers, but all 
they lack a concrete example or a model of how to determine who is or will be a hybrid threat.  
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a tool, the modified model of identifying a hybrid ad-
versary. 
The frame of reference in this thesis is presented in Figure 1.  The concepts of warfare have 
been drawn into a single picture and a hybrid adversary is derived from hybrid warfare.  The 
more precise composition of a hybrid adversary is presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1: Hybrid Warfare and Hybrid Adversary.
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When determining a hybrid adversary, three core variables emerge: capability, maturity and 
complex terrain.  Each of these core variables can be divided into sub-variables.  Capability 
can be divided into three sub-variables, namely weapon, training and sustainability.  Maturity 
can be divided into four sub-variables, namely strategy, organization and cohesion, respon-
siveness to internal and external sponsor, and lastly leadership.  Complex terrain includes the 
geographical aspect and the people involved, but takes into account the cyberspace present 
everywhere these days.  All these sub-variables can be broken down to smaller entities, which 
can be seen in figure 2.  When a group or an organization is studied in this framework, across 
these variables, it is located somewhere along the circle in each entity.  The closer a group or 
an organization gets to the light red or darker red marked area towards the center of the circle, 
the more potential it has to become or it already is a hybrid threat in a possible conflict within 
that area of its influence.  If a group moves within the center of the circle in one or more sub-
variables, it has lost the leverage of hybrid kind in that particular entity, and as a result it may 
even lose the edge of becoming or being a hybrid threat at all.  It is possible to move “up and 
down” within one or more sub-variables, even core variables along the circle, meaning the 
edge of hybridity can be both achieved and lost.  This model to determine a hybrid threat pre-
sented by Major Christopher O. Bowers will be discussed and explained in further detail in 
chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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Figure 2: Hybrid adversary
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In this thesis the concept of hybrid threat and hybrid adversary is discussed.  The focus will be 
on the perspective of the United States Armed Forces.  This is because the concept of hybrid 
threat was brought into the discussion by American military thinkers as a result of the experi-
ences in Iraq and Afghanistan and the discussion about hybrid warfare.  Hybrid threat being 
the descendant of the debate about the hybrid warfare prior to the official definition of hybrid 
threat in FM 3-0: Operations.  The United States of America represents the largest military 
power in the world today, it exercises this power every day, and it dominates the research and 
discussion about theoretical military thinking in general, thus making the American point of 
view relevant and obvious.   
Two organizations, namely Hezbollah and Taliban are studied in this thesis in the context of 
the model represented earlier.  These two organizations are chosen, because of their relevance 
in the conflicts of today.  Hezbollah is considered as the most advanced terrorist organization 
of the world that has developed over time to a respectable adversary by any measure.  Its per-
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formance in the Second Lebanon War (2006) is considered a text book example of hybrid 
warfare.  The entire hybrid threat concept can be applied to it easily and it can be argued that it 
has had an enormous effect in the development of the concept.  Furthermore, Hezbollah has 
played a significant role in the creation of the modified model of identifying a hybrid adver-
sary that is presented, developed and tested in this thesis, thus making it a necessary choice to 
further explain the model.
22
  Taliban, on the other hand, represents an organization that has 
many similarities yet differences with Hezbollah, and gets a lot of press time due to the large 
and long Western coalition campaign in Afghanistan.  The Western militaries have been oper-
ating in Afghanistan over ten years without being able to strip the Taliban of arms and remove 
them from the power behind the scenes.   The fact that there are Finnish troops deployed to 
both Lebanon and Afghanistan makes both organizations relevant choices from the perspec-
tive of the Finnish military as well.  In this thesis the focus is only on the Taliban movement 
in Afghanistan, and that will not include other Taliban groups based in Pakistan such as 
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.  Either the term Taliban or Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) 
is used when discussing the Afghan Taliban movement. 
Only these two organizations are examined due to the limited time available.  They are studied 
in the historical context up to date with respect to the model introduced.  The historical study-
ing of Hezbollah is limited to start from 1970’s up to date and with Taliban from the 1990’s 
up to date.  If needed, the history prior to these dates will be briefly discussed.  With neither 
Hezbollah nor Taliban, their modus operandi in the battle field is not presented in absolute de-
tail, but rather stayed with larger entities. Nor are any courses of action discussed that should 
be taken provided that a Taliban, or any organization for that matter, fits the hybrid adversary 
model.   
The references for this thesis are public, and mainly accessible through internet.  No classified 
documents are used, because it is not be necessary to go that much into detail due to the nature 
of the model tested. 
1.4 References 
Hybrid warfare has been an inspiration to a number of articles in western military magazines 
since the emergence of the term.  It has inspired particularly American military thinkers and 
the best known advocate for hybrid warfare is Mr. Frank Hoffman, a former United States 
Marine Corps officer.  He has written a number of articles and just to name one, a paper called 
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“Conflict in the 21st century: Rise of Hybrid Wars”23 is a profound introduction to the modern 
day warfare and the development of hybrid warfare.  Hybrid warfare has also been an inspira-
tion for a large number of academic studies done in graduate and post-graduate schools of 
western militaries, from William J. Nemeth’s “Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid 
War”24 to author’s own Senior Staff Officer Course thesis “Hybrid Warfare: Just a Twist of 
Compound Warfare”25.  In some recent articles and studies there are arguments presented for 
the need to officially define hybrid warfare, although hybrid warfare is not officially defined 
by TRADOC or any other branch of the U.S. Armed Forces.  The debate seems to go on. 
Hybrid threat and the operational environment are discussed in detail in the existing field 
manuals, most of them dealing with counterinsurgency (COIN).  As mentioned before, U.S. 
Army Field Manual 3-0: Operations, Change 1 (Feb22, 2011) defines hybrid threat and dis-
cusses it in detail.   
Dr. David E. Johnson, who is currently the Director, Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic 
Studies Group, has written while a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation the 
monograph “Hard Fighting: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza”26 dealing with the Second Lebanon 
War (2006) and the Operation Cast Lead (2008).  He discusses the implications of the IDF 
experiences in these two wars to the U.S. Armed Forces.  He also discusses the nature of hy-
brid adversaries, in this case Hezbollah and Hamas, providing thus important discussion re-
garding this thesis. Dr. Johnson has also written a number of works about hybrid “middle 
range” threats and he provides valuable information about the Second Lebanon War (2006), 
Hezbollah and hybrid threats in general.   
Dr. Russell Glenn, a senior defense and political analyst with RAND Corporation has written 
“Thoughts on "Hybrid" Conflict”27 and “All Glory Is Fleeting; Insights from the Second Leb-
anon War”28, both providing worthwhile discussion about hybrid warfare, hybrid threats and 
experiences of the Second Lebanon War. 
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Hybrid adversary and the problem of defining one, was the inspiration of an article written by 
U.S. Army Major Christopher O. Bowers in Parameters, a U.S. Army senior professional 
journal.  In his article “Identifying Emerging Hybrid Adversaries”29, he discusses the dangers 
of a fighting force of irregular type possessing advanced military capabilities normally associ-
ated only with nation states, and thus posing an international security risk.  He offers a model 
to detect possible hybrid adversaries or emerging ones.  This article has been the inspiration 
for this thesis and this thesis will test the model created by MAJ Bowers.  
Hezbollah and Taliban have both been an inspiration for a large number of studies and books 
over the last decade.  The Second Lebanon War (2006), as mentioned earlier, is considered the 
best example of hybrid warfare, and Hezbollah an example of an organization to carry out a 
hybrid war.  Avi Kober’s article, ”The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: 
Why the Poor Performance?” provides the background for the chapter dealing with an exam-
ple of a hybrid war, the capitalizing threat of hybrid kind.  It describes the multiple challenges 
faced by today’s Western militaries when fighting an opponent fitting the model represented 
by Major Bowers.
30
   
Mr. Anthony H. Cordesman’s study “Preliminary ‘Lessons’ of the Israeli-Hezbollah War”31 
from 2006, and a presentation “The Lessons of the Israeli-Lebanon War”32 from 2008, provide 
compact picture of the failures and successes of both Hezbollah and Israel in the war.  The 
newer presentation has more accurate information on the war since more reliable data has 
been available.  Mr. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for 
Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) and has received a Department of Defense Distin-
guished Service Medal for his work.
33
  The Winograd Commission Final Report reveals the 
official results of the Israeli investigation of the Second Lebanon War 2006, and thus provides 
the Israeli view on the war as far as successes and failures are concerned.
34
 
Background for Hezbollah is provided by Mr. Eitan Azani’s “Hezbollah – The Story of the 
Party of God”35.  Mr. Azani presents an Israeli view on Hezbollah, since he is the Deputy Di-
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rector of the international Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the Inter Disciplinary Cen-
ter in Israel.  The American view is presented by Mr. Augustus Richard Norton, a professor of 
international relations and anthropology at Boston University and a former U.S. Army officer 
and West Point professor, in his book “Hezbollah”36.  Mr. Joseph Alegha’s book “Hizbullah – 
Identity Construction”37 contradicts some statements made by Mr. Norton.  Mr. Alegha has 
written a number of books on Hezbollah and is an associate professor of the Islamic studies at 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands, thus presenting likely a more neutral view.  
Nicholas Blanford’s book, “Warriors of God; Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle 
Against Israel”, is a valuable book based on his 15 year experience on Hezbollah providing 
the background of Hezbollah’s ideology, motivations, training and tactics over the thirty years 
of development of the organization. 
The history and background of Taliban as a powerful religious organization shaping Afghani-
stan’s past and future is provided by the book called “The Taliban and the Crises of Afghani-
stan”38 edited by Mr. Robert D. Crews and Mr. Amin Tarzi.  Mr. Crews is an assistance pro-
fessor of History at Stanford University and Mr. Tarzi is the director of Middle East Studies at 
Marine Corps University.  Their book also discusses the errors made by the American inter-
vention and the reconstruction of Afghanistan during the first decade of the 21
st 
century.  An-
other worthy source for background information about Taliban and the ideology behind it is 
the report written by Ms. Anne Stenersen for Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 
(FFI).  In her report “The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan – organization, leadership and 
worldview”39 she discusses the role of Taliban in the post-2001 Afghan insurgency and its or-
ganizational characteristics. 
There are many academic works and articles done on both Hezbollah and Taliban in the mili-
tary schools and magazines.  The full list of references is presented in Chapter 8: References. 
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2 HYBRID WAR – HEZBOLLAH IN SECOND LEBANON WAR 
In this chapter the Second Lebanon War of 2006 is discussed as an example of hybrid war, 
and Hezbollah introduced as a potential adversary in a hybrid war – a hybrid adversary – the 
sort of adversary western militaries may face in the future.   
2.1 Hezbollah 
Hezbollah is a Shia Muslim political group with a militant wing called the Islamic Resistance.  
Hezbollah is defined as a terrorist organization by the West.  The group is active in Lebanon, 
and can be described as a “state-within-a-state”. Along with the activities of its military wing, 
Hezbollah is also a major provider of social services, operating schools, hospitals, and agricul-
tural services for thousands of Lebanese Shias.  It has participated actively in the Lebanese po-
litical system since 1992 - having had over the recent years from two to eleven out of thirty 
seats in the Lebanese national unity cabinet. Hezbollah operates a satellite TV channel, al-
Manar, and a broadcast station - both are in the West regarded as terrorist entities.  Ideological 
and financial support for the organization is provided by Iran and Syria; in addition Hezbollah 
raises funds from criminal activities, such as counterfeiting money and drug production and 
trade.
40
 
2.1.1 Background 
The seeds for Hezbollah were planted among the Lebanese Shias in the late 1970’s as a result 
of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1977), and two Israeli campaigns in Lebanon in 1978 and 
1982.  Hezbollah was to counter the Amal Movement, the largest Shia organization in Leba-
non at the time.  It was a new organization, separate from PLO or other Palestinian groups op-
erating in the area.  In 1982, a group of Lebanese Shia Muslims declared themselves to be the 
“Party of God” (Hizb Allah), as a response to the Israeli invasions of Lebanon.  Islamic re-
sistance units were formed and were committed to the liberation of the occupied territories 
and the ejection of the Israeli forces.  As soon as it was realized that the Israel Defense Forces 
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(IDF) intended to stay in South Lebanon, the (at that time inexperienced) Hezbollah resistance 
cells began to develop its military competence with the desire to resist the Israeli occupation.  
It was assisted both ideologically and logistically by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards based 
in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley - originally sent there to aid in the resistance against Israel.  Hez-
bollah began developing its popular base in Lebanon, and has over the years expanded and 
strengthened both its political and military capacity.
41
 
Hezbollah draws inspiration form the Iranian Revolution, and it is dedicated to the creation of 
an Iranian style Islamic republic in Lebanon, and the removal of all non-Islamic influences 
from the area.  It is strongly anti-Western and especially anti-Israel in its ideology.  Since the 
organization was founded it has received substantial support from Iran and Syria, both finan-
cial and military training support.  The affiliation between Iran and Hezbollah has always been 
a close one.  There is a strong religious and ideological tie between Iran and Hezbollah – both 
being Shia Muslims.  Iran has had a great effect on Hezbollah’s improved capabilities by de-
livering vital material and moral support to Hezbollah over the years.
42
    
Syria on the other hand has been, and still is a close supporter of Hezbollah.  There are two 
main reasons for Syria to support Hezbollah.  Syria has had its own conflicts and confronta-
tions with Israel over the occupation of Golan Heights and it has had interests to look after in 
Lebanon, both of which still exist.  Thus Hezbollah served as a useful tool for Syria in the re-
gions’ political field.  In the light of the recent Syrian conflict of the rebel effort to topple the 
regime of Bashar Assad, there are reports of Hezbollah actively participating in the support of 
Assad’s regime in Syria.  Syria is of great interest to Hezbollah due to the substantial support 
it has received in the military built up over the years, and it is the main conduit for the weap-
ons and ammunition from Iran.
43
  
Hezbollah is a Shia Muslim organization in which religion plays an important political role.  
Shias differ from Sunni Muslims in the way they look at leadership, not the spiritual aspect of 
religion.  Shias believe their leadership, either religious or political – which often go hand in 
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hand – descend directly from the family of the Prophet Mohammad or God himself.  There-
fore among the Shias, Imams are considered sinless by nature and their authority infallible 
since it comes directly from God or the family of the Prophet.  Hence the leaders are highly 
respected, and their authority unquestioned.  Among the Muslims Shias are a minority with 
approximately 15% of the Muslim population of the world.  The attitude towards the divine 
authority of Shia Imam’s explains how Shia organizations may turn fanatical and be consid-
ered to behave like terrorist organizations in the West.
44
   
2.1.2 Early Terrorist Campaigns  
Once established as a militia, Hezbollah received acclaim and legitimacy in Lebanon and 
throughout the Muslim world by fighting against the IDF and the South Lebanese Army 
(SLA).  Its base areas were, and still are, Lebanon’s Shiite dominated areas, parts of Beirut, 
Southern Lebanon and Bekaa Valley.  Aside from its activities in Lebanon, in 1980’s and ear-
ly 1990’s Hezbollah conducted a global terrorist strategy with a capability to operate all over 
the world, and they carried out terrorist attacks against Israeli and US targets. Hezbollah fo-
cused on South America, Southeast Asia, Jordan, the Persian Gulf, and the European conti-
nent.
45
      
During the 1980’s and early 1990’s, Hezbollah was behind a series of terrorist attacks against 
Western targets such as a suicide bombings of the U.S. embassy in Beirut (1983), U.S. Ma-
rines base in Beirut (1983), the U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut (1984), aircraft hijackings 
(Trans World Airlines 1985, Kuwaiti Airlines 1984 and 1988), the attack on the Israeli Em-
bassy in Argentina (1992) and a number of kidnappings of U.S. and European civilians as 
well as French, British, German and Russian diplomats.  Hezbollah was responsible for most 
of the kidnappings of foreign nationals carried out in Lebanon during that time period (at least 
18 citizens of Western countries were held hostage, and three of them were killed).  It is said 
that Hezbollah acted as Iranian proxy, and was thus heavily influenced, even its actions di-
rected by Iran over this period of time.  In the 1990’s, following a shift in Iranian policy, Hez-
bollah lowered the profile of its anti-Western pursuits and focused its attention on terrorist ac-
tivity against Israeli and Jewish targets.
46
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In the beginning of the 21
st
 century, there was an increasing cooperation between Hezbollah 
and other Palestinian terrorist organizations in the region.
47
  It was very active against the IDF 
during the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in May 2000.  Focus was transferred to 
violent activities in Israeli territory with the aim to disrupt any attempt for dialogue, or the 
peace process in general.
48
   
However, since the September 11, 2001 attacks, Hezbollah made considerable efforts to pro-
mote its image in order to blur its identity as a terrorist organization.  It publicly denied its in-
volvement in terrorism in general, and in particular, its capability of global terrorism.
49
  Yet 
despite the Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah continued periodically to 
shell Israeli forces in the disputed Shebaa Farms border zone resulting a periodic conflict and 
retaliation from Israel.
50
  In the end of 2005, Hezbollah and the IDF had a heavy exchange of 
fire across the Blue Line established by the UN Security Council resolutions 425 and 426 for 
the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.  Both sides used heavy weapons against each oth-
er.  Since the withdrawal of IDF from Lebanon, Hezbollah had built its military capabilities 
substantially with the support of Iran and Syria.
51
    
The Taif Accord in 1989 ended the Lebanese Civil War.  The fighting of numerous sectarian 
militias, including Hezbollah and AMAL (the rival of Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon) was 
stopped by Syria and Iran.  Syrian forces occupied Lebanon and could have destroyed Hezbol-
lah militarily, but instead Hezbollah convinced Syria’s President Assad that Hezbollah would 
be a useful resistance force against Israel.  Thus, heavily influenced by Syria, the Lebanese 
administration accepted Hezbollah as the only militia organization in Lebanon, whereas all 
other ethnic militias were to be dismantled.  Along with the weakness of the Lebanese central 
regime, Hezbollah’s special status enabled the organization to use its power and seize both 
military and civilian control in Southern Lebanon (and several areas of the Bekaa region), 
practically replacing the legitimate Lebanese regime. This process continued even after the 
IDF withdrawal from Lebanon. Southern Lebanon had in fact turned into a state-within-a-
state.  Hezbollah thus became the ultimate authority in this region, undisturbed by the Leba-
nese regime’s weak control, which focused mainly on economic development projects that 
were themselves approved by Hezbollah.  Hezbollah pursued its own policy in southern Leba-
non, which it imposed on the Lebanese government.  It opposed the effective deployment of 
the Lebanese army in the South thus preventing the Lebanese regime from assuming responsi-
                                                 
47
 Hizballah, p. 3, and Hezbollah (2003), pp. 96-99. 
48
 Hizballah, p. 2. 
49
 Hezbollah (2003), p. 65. 
50
 Hizballah, p. 4. 
25 
 
bility for this region’s security and implementing its sovereignty.  According to the resolution 
425 of the UN Security Council, the Lebanese army was to deploy in the South of the country.  
However, receiving strong support from Syria, Hezbollah openly rejected the deployment of 
Lebanese Army to the South, and carried on as before.
52
 
The Shia community had been the largest, and yet the most underprivileged ethnic community 
in Lebanon.  For Hezbollah this created a fertile soil for gaining support with an extensive so-
cial and economic program, since the Lebanese government had lacked the initiative to im-
prove the situation.  Far-reaching social and welfare activities were carried out by Hezbollah, 
including schools, women’s affairs, health and medical services, social welfare and religious 
education.  All these were financed by the funds received from international fundraisers and 
its support from Iran and Syria.  Unsurprisingly, Hezbollah earned the trust and support of the 
Shia community as well as some non-Shias.  The social and economic programs served Hez-
bollah’s aims to gain political power in Lebanon and its ultimate goal of forming an Islamic 
republic in Lebanon.
53
 
2.2  Background To The Second Lebanon War 
After the withdrawal of IDF from Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah kept close ties to Iran and Syr-
ia and began arming itself.  High quality weapons, such as land-to-land rockets, anti-tank 
weapons, anti-aircraft missiles, mines and mortar rounds as well as explosives, small arms and 
ammunition, were being smuggled to Lebanon.
54
  The tensions were high in the region and 
occasional clashes with IDF occurred.  In September 2004 the UN Security Council resolution 
1559 called for the Lebanese government to disband and disarm all Lebanese and non-
Lebanese militias and to prevent the flow of armaments and other military equipment to the 
militias from Syria, Iran and other nations.  The Lebanese government did not comply with 
the resolution – Hezbollah was very popular among the Shiites, it had built a considerable 
military strength, and it did not want the Lebanese army in the Southern Lebanon – Hezbollah 
territory.
55
  The November 2005 clash between Hezbollah and IDF, in its shortness and inten-
sity, was like a prologue to the Second Lebanon War the following year.
56
  The military and 
financial support Hezbollah received from Iran and Syria did not go unnoticed by the interna-
tional community.  As late as mid April 2006, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called on 
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Syria and Iran to stop interfering in Lebanon.  But the situation had already developed for the 
worse.
57
 
2.3 A Retaliatory Campaign Escalating to a War 
The 33-day long Second Lebanon War was initiated by the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers 
by Hezbollah near Shtula on the Lebanese-Israeli border on July 12, 2006.  The kidnapping 
Hezbollah unit had crossed the border during a diversion attack of Katyusha rockets and mor-
tar rounds against the border villages and IDF positions. Israel responded and launched a 
large-scale retaliatory operation which eventually escalated into a war.
58
 
The war that ended in a ceasefire agreement on August 13, 2006, can be divided into three 
phases, seen from the Israeli point of view. 
- Phase I: Air campaign (July 12-16) 
- Phase II: Engagement of ground forces (July 18 – August 11)  
- Phase III: Final push (August 12-13) 
The first phase of the Israeli retaliatory operation began with a massive use of Israel Air Force 
(IAF).  The IDF imposed air and sea blockades on Lebanon.  The IAF attacked suspected 
Hezbollah command posts in Beirut, including military targets along the Beirut – Damascus 
highway and elsewhere, and tried to destroy the long-range missile launchers used by Hezbol-
lah against Northern Israel.  Israel refrained from bombing Lebanese infrastructure, although 
the IDF Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Halutz had suggested that, thus imposing itself re-
strictions to conduct the operation. Israel also avoided a direct confrontation with Syria, de-
spite the support it gave to Hezbollah.  Within the first two days of the war, the IAF destroyed 
most of the Hezbollah’s medium and long-range missile launchers, along with the Hezbollah 
command centers in Beirut. Yet the Israeli retaliatory campaign faced a surprise, when a mis-
sile corvette INS Hanith, one of Israel’s newest and most capable ships, while monitoring the 
naval blockade, was hit with an anti-ship missile fired by Hezbollah.
59
  Lebanese government 
asked for a ceasefire on July 14, which was turned down few days later.
60
 
According to Kober, this was the culmination point of the operation – the efficiency of the air 
campaign would only get worse as the time went on.  The situation could not be solved with 
air assets alone.  This was recognized in the IDF high command, and on July 16, the IDF 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Moshe Kaplinski recommended stopping the operation, 
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but the highest political and military leaders thought otherwise. Thus the retaliatory operation 
started to escalate into a war.
61
 
In the beginning of the operation the Israeli political and military leadership was both con-
fused and indecisive of the objectives and methods to reach them.
62
  As an example, the IDF 
Chief of Staff was initially thinking of the operation “in terms of a retaliatory attack, not war”, 
and even instructed his subordinates at the General Staff level not to use the term “war” re-
garding the operation.
63
  In retrospect, it can be concluded that Israel had five objectives in the 
war:   
- Destroy the “Iranian Western Command” before Iran could develop nuclear weapons. 
- Restore credibility of the Israeli deterrence after the withdrawals from Lebanon (2000) 
and Gaza (2005). 
- Try to force Lebanon to act as an accountable state, including the end of Hezbollah’s 
“state-with-in-state” status. 
- Damage or cripple Hezbollah while understanding it could not be destroyed as a mili-
tary force, and would continue to be a major political player in Lebanon. 
- Bring the two captured soldiers without major trades of prisoners held by Israel.64      
Although the operation was initially thought to be carried out based on an air campaign, a re-
serve infantry division was mobilized as early as on July 13 (eventually, three more infantry 
divisions were mobilized).
65
  Regardless of the damage inflicted on the Hezbollah long-range 
missiles and launcher arsenal, Hezbollah still had the capability to fire hundreds of short-range 
rockets a day into Northern Israel. This caused serious, but above all, moral damage to the Is-
raeli civilian population living in the area. It was now finally understood by Israel’s political 
and military leadership that the war could not be won without the ground element, and it felt 
forced to commit ground forces into battle, with the mission of destroying Hezbollah’s posi-
tions along the Israel-Lebanon border.
66
 
On July 18, the second phase began – IDF committed ground forces in battle in Southern Leb-
anon.  The Israeli forces attacked head on against the Hezbollah forces in Southern Lebanon, 
uncharacteristically to its tradition of mechanized warfare of outflanking and encircling the 
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enemy, including the use of the element of surprise.  The audacious fighting capabilities of 
Hezbollah came as a surprise to the troops on the ground.  This was the result of a failure of 
the Israeli Military intelligence community – it had not distributed the ground forces with 
timely and accurate intelligence prior to engaging Hezbollah.  Military Intelligence had 
claimed the information was too highly classified.
67
  The Israeli troops on the ground faced a 
prepared enemy, including well-prepared defense lines and bunker systems, well-armed troops 
with missiles, rockets, mortars, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and advanced lighter 
arms like anti-tank weapons and surface-to-air missiles.
68
  Fighting was fierce but ineffective, 
seen from the Israeli point of view, and the short range rockets launched by Hezbollah kept 
terrorizing the civilian population in Northern Israel. The IDF operations kept building up. On 
July 29 there was an increased effort by the Israeli’s to create a security belt on the Northern 
Lebanese border.  The ground troops took hold of dominating terrain and Special Forces hit 
targets in Bekaa Valley and Tyre.  Yet regarding the overall effort, it had not much effect.
69
   
Due to the ineffectiveness of the IDF in the battlefield against Hezbollah’s ground positions in 
Southern Lebanon, and particularly the IAF’s inability in handling the continuous short-range 
rocket launcher threat to Northern Israel
70
, it became evident that unless the territory from 
where the rockets were launched was captured, the threat would not disappear. This set the 
stage for the third phase of the war. Although cease fire negotiations were on-going, an opera-
tion was planned to capture the entire area south of the Litany River. The operation was ap-
proved by the Israeli government, because they thought it would give both military and politi-
cal flexibility in the cease-fire negotiations.
71
  Israeli troops in the area nearly tripled, and on 
August 11, the operation began.  It was never to accomplish its objectives, because the cease-
fire took effect on August 13.
72
 
2.4 Characteristic of the Second Lebanon War and Hezbollah 
Since the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 up to the Second Lebanon War in Ju-
ly-August 2006, Hezbollah had developed dramatically from a terrorist militia to a formidable 
adversary.  It had developed its military capabilities and thinking enormously.  This had been 
done with the support of Iran and Syria.  Hezbollah had recognized the advantage the difficult 
terrain in Southern Lebanon gave to the defender, it had learned to analyze the terrain from the 
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perspective of the armored offender, namely Israel, and began preparing the battle field ac-
cordingly
73
.  A sophisticated and well equipped bunker system with trenches, tunnels and 
fighting positions was built in Southern Lebanon, both in villages and in the “nature re-
serves”.74  Some of these bunkers were 20-30 meters underground and equipped with con-
cealed rocket firing positions. Hilltop villages were actually Hezbollah “fortresses” offering 
clear fields of fire, cover and concealment.
75
 
Another demonstration of developed military thinking of Hezbollah was the conclusion of its 
leadership to focus on fighter training on unconventional means, organizing small fighting 
units in a cellular manner, and equipping them with weapons normally associated with nation 
states.  These small units were to fight with guerrilla warfare tactics (e.g. ambushes, attack 
and withdraw) – typical elements of hybrid warfare.  Nicholas Blanford describes well Hez-
bollah’s cellular organization and capabilities in southern Lebanon in his article in Jane’s In-
telligence Review: 
The IR [Islamic Resistance, Hezbollah’s military wing] splits south Lebanon in-
to several sectors, each one consisting of between 12 and 15 villages. Each sec-
tor was subdivided into smaller components of two to three villages. All sectors 
remained in close contact with each other and the IR leadership in Beirut using 
sophisticated fibre-optic communications that resisted IDF jamming and inter-
ception measures. A Hizbullah official said that each sector had the power to act 
autonomously if communications were severed, although IR’s chain of command 
remained unbroken throughout the conflict. On the sub-sector level, fighters 
used Motorola walkie-talkies. Each fighter was issued a code number and com-
municated using an ad hoc code based on local and personal knowledge of each 
other that would be meaningless to an eavesdropper. 
The IR forces on the ground in south Lebanon were split essentially into two 
wings. The first was the full-time military force of experienced, well-trained, 
highly disciplined and motivated guerrilla fighters, aged from their late twenties 
to late thirties.  Numbering a few hundred, the full-timers were deployed in the 
network of bunkers and tunnels in south Lebanon as well as other locations.  
These fighters, equipped with military uniforms, were split into teams of 15 to 20 
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and chiefly were responsible for artillery rockets, advanced anti-tank missiles 
and sniping. . . . 
The second wing was the “village guard” units, many of them veteran guerrilla 
combatants from the 1990s when the IDF occupied south Lebanon. Although 
they share the same high degree of motivation and discipline as their full-time 
comrades, the village guards were an irregular force of part-time personnel. 
The guards remained in their villages after most civilians had fled north. In the 
event of an IDF ground invasion, the village guards would provide successive 
layers of defence consisting of fresh, well-armed fighters able to take advantage 
of their intimate knowledge of the local terrain to interdict and frustrate the IDF 
advance.  The village guards, dressed in civilian clothing, were armed with AK-
47 assault rifles, light machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and AT-3 Sag-
ger anti-tank missiles.
76
 
One could say the command network of Hezbollah was well developed with fiber-optic com-
munications and with the authority to act and fight autonomously if the communication lines 
were cut to their command.   From the description Blanford gives one could almost argue that 
Hezbollah conducted compound warfare, the first wing, full time fighters being the “regular 
army”, and the second wing, the part-time “village guard”, being the guerrilla force.  The first 
wearing the uniforms, symbols of a regular army and the latter wearing civilian clothes, typi-
cal of a guerrilla force.  The locally based “village guard” members fought near their homes, 
they were very familiar with their area of operation and enjoyed wide popular support.  They 
relied on stockpiled supplies and thus needed not to provide transportation or to protect lines 
of communication.  This cellular organization applied to Hezbollah fighters from Southern 
Lebanon to the Beirut suburbs and the Bekaa Valley.
77
 
Typical of the Second Lebanon War was that as IDF engaged with Hezbollah, they often faced 
fighting in urban areas.  Hezbollah had built its facilities and positions in villages and popu-
lated areas.  It used civilian facilities and homes to store weapons and supplies, as well as for 
defensive and offensive positions.  Rockets and mortars were deployed within villages and 
homes; with the Hezbollah soldiers rushing in and out to carry out firing missions.
78
   Hezbol-
lah used the people of Lebanon as human shields for their advantage, clearly against the rules 
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of the international laws of war.  As mentioned earlier by Blanford, Hezbollah “village guard” 
wore civilian clothes and thus made it difficult to distinguish between militants and civilians.  
Either way, IDF faced the challenge of accurate target intelligence and collateral damage – 
how to verify targets to be engaged with different types of weapons and how to avoid collat-
eral damage?  How much to limit the strikes and the use of force, if military operations were 
carried out of civilian facilities, or in the immediate vicinity of them?  On the other hand, if 
the IDF Chief of Staff had publicly stated a threat of “setting Lebanon back 20 years”, it is 
tempting, if not evitable, for a non-state actor with terrorist status to use civilians as human 
shields.
79
  Collateral damage would play for the benefit of Hezbollah in this case; it would be 
excellent media operations material to bring the population on their side.
80
    It would make no 
difference from the Israeli point of view whether the collateral damage appearing on the media 
were actually civilian clothed “village guard” members or true civilians – either way, all that 
mattered in the end was how it appeared.  In light of statistics, this could easily be done.
81
  
The Hezbollah leadership used effectively its own TV- and broadcast capabilities to send out 
their own message to their supporters, to their foes and to international press.
82
 
Another characteristic of Hezbollah fighting during the conflict was their effective use of the 
advanced weapon systems it had acquired before the war, such as anti-tank weapons, anti-
aircraft missiles, anti-ship missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles. The anti-tank weapons were 
used skillfully in terms of tactics – multiple weapons were fired at the same target indicating 
that the use of anti-tank weapons was concentrated in anticipated kill zones. Anti-tank weap-
ons were effectively used against IDF ground troops seeking protection from buildings, and 
these kinds of weapons actually caused most of the casualties of IDF in the war.
83
  The anti-
aircraft missile capability, which existence was known by the Israeli intelligence community 
played an important role from the Hezbollah’s perspective, although it could only drop one 
IAF aircraft during the war.
84
  Just the knowledge of short range air-defense missiles pos-
sessed by Hezbollah forced IAF to change mission profiles and to use extensively counter-
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measures to avoid possible ambushes to IAF planes.  A successful ambush could have provid-
ed Hezbollah with a propaganda victory.
85
  
In the first days of the war Hezbollah damaged INS Hanith with an anti-ship missile, a capa-
bility thought to be possessed only by national armies rather than by an organization with ter-
rorist status. Israeli intelligence had given estimates of such weapons in the possession of 
Hezbollah as early as 2003, but the Israel Navy did not take the warning seriously, and as a re-
sult missile corvette INS Hanith operated without using active countermeasures and the ship 
was struck.
86
   
The unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) supplied by Iran
87
 provided Hezbollah with another 
force multiplier.  With a range of up to 450 kilometers and payload capability of 45 kg it could 
deliver its load practically anywhere in Israel with an accuracy of 10 m with the GPS guidance 
system.  One penetrated Israeli air defense system and was shot down by IAF 15 km from Hai-
fa. This demonstrated a new threat to Israel, since the UAVs could not be detected with the 
normal surveillance radars and had new repercussions unimaginable had the payload been 
chemical or biological weapons.
88
  
It is estimated that Hezbollah possessed approximately 15,000 short, medium and long range 
rockets prior to the 2006 war.  Although the long and medium range rockets and missiles 
threat to Israel was dismissed by IAF during the first days of the war, Hezbollah demonstrated 
its capability to inflict damage and a continuous threat to the Northern Israel civilian popula-
tion by the firing of short range rockets continuously during the entire war.  The smaller rock-
ets required smaller launchers; they were moved and hidden easily and were both quick to set 
up and fire – a weapon that was used very effectively.89  Some of these rocket launchers 
(Katyushas) had been pre-positioned in the concrete shelters built before the Second Lebanon 
War and with a developed automatic remote controlled launching system required only few 
fighters to use them. With prepositioned stockpiles of rockets, Hezbollah was able to maintain 
an average launching rate of 90-150 a day throughout the war.
90
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Hezbollah had developed its intelligence capabilities as well, including signals intelligence 
(SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT) and image intelligence (IMINT) by using UAVs
91
.  
HUMINT and UAV’s were used to target Israeli military installations.  There were some re-
ports of Iranian promoted electronic warfare capabilities of Hezbollah during the war, such as 
jamming and successful hacking of Israeli communications, which Israel has denied.  Israeli 
soldiers captured sophisticated Iranian made “eavesdropping devices, computers, and modern 
communications equipment”92.  It can be said that Hezbollah was well prepared to fight the 
war under the influence of Israeli electronic warfare; with earlier mentioned fiber-optics 
communications it could maintain its command network throughout the war.  It even pre-
served “high level of security and encryption” in order to protect its own communications 
from Israeli SIGINT.
93
 
2.5 Summary 
Looking at the outcome of the Second Lebanon War, one must admit that Hezbollah emerged 
as the one having better reached its set goals for the war than Israel.  Israel could not restore 
credibility of deterrence, but the effect was rather the opposite. Kober points out serious 
weaknesses of IDF that were exposed: a late perception that it was war; adherence to post-
heroic warfare  under circumstances that rather required a different approach; the erosion of 
the IDF’s fighting standards due to policing missions; artificial Revolution in Military Affairs 
–inspired concepts; the adoption of the notion of controlling instead of capturing territory; a 
centralized logistic system; poor generalship; a hesitant and inexperienced political leadership 
and IDF dominance in decisions on military matters.
94
 All these problems could be discussed 
in some detail, but are out of the scope of this thesis.  Lebanon was not forced to act as a cred-
ible state to end the Hezbollah’s “state-with-in-state” status. Rather this war forced the Leba-
nese Government to ask the international community for support against the Israeli aggression 
towards Lebanon.
95
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Looking at Hezbollah’s strategic goals of the war:   
- Survive and adapt to an Israeli-driven escalation 
- Inflict maximum casualties in forward area 
- Win limited war of attrition 
- Demonstrate the ability to strike into Israel with short and long range weapons 
- Dominate media battle 
- Enhance post-war status in Lebanon and Islamic world 
- Emerge with political leadership, most weapons and key cadres intact 
- Prevent from being disarmed after the war96   
It can be said that Hezbollah was successful in almost all of them.   
Hezbollah was unable to inflict real heavy casualties to IDF or Israel in general, but the dam-
ages caused were higher than expected, and as Israel has a democratic elected government, 
casualties are always a problem.  The long range missile weapon systems were used in the be-
ginning of the war, but were quickly taken out by the IAF.  Yet the continuous use of short 
range rockets and the use of UAV have demonstrated adequately the Hezbollah striking capa-
bility beyond close range.  As a result of the ceasefire it was not disarmed nor was Hezbollah 
incapacitated.  It could continue to rebuild its lost capabilities, and continue to be an important 
part of Lebanese politics, and it has.  
The reasons for Hezbollah’s achievements are many.  It can be said that Israel underestimated 
the new capabilities of Hezbollah, both politically and militarily, and at the same time overes-
timated its own capability to win the war by waging only an air campaign without the use of 
an extensive ground element.
97
  Perhaps the biggest failure of Israel in the Second Lebanon 
War was that it escalated the retaliatory operation into a war before the Israeli government had 
decided whether to conduct a short and powerful blow on Hezbollah, or to bring about a sig-
nificant change in Southern Lebanon with a large ground operation.  In addition, the Israelis 
went to war without deciding on an exit strategy.
98
   
Not only did Hezbollah possess weapons usually associated with national armies, but it used 
them with considerable precision and skill.  With modern standoff weapons and advanced 
guerrilla tactics included with the exclusion of internationally accepted rules of war, such as 
the use of civilians or civilian targets as shields for operative troops was something IDF was 
not prepared for.  But as Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah said 
                                                 
96
 Cordesman (2008), p. 7. 
97 
Cordesman (2008), p. 5; Johnson D.E. (2011a), p. 56, pp. 60-61. 
35 
 
“…we are not a regular army.  We will not fight like a regular army.”99  They did not, and it 
worked against Israel, a foe thinking and fighting according to the Western standards.  The 
command system of Hezbollah was decentralized and responsibilities were distributed to 
smaller cells, thus giving the organization flexibility and strength to carry on fighting despite 
the fact that any of these independent cells were incapacitated.  During the years before the 
war, Hezbollah had plenty of time to build its defensive positions in Southern Lebanon ac-
cording to their estimates of possible battle spaces, and prepare for the eventually inevitable 
armed conflict, if not war, against Israel.  With the decentralized command system going hand 
in hand with a decentralized logistics system, the small cells had well planned resources avail-
able for them and gave them logistical independence from the upper echelons, which is often 
not the case with national armies. 
The support of Iran and Syria to Hezbollah was crucial to Hezbollah before and during the 
war.  Since Israel’s 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon, both countries supported and supplied the 
Hezbollah military build-up extensively bringing weapons and military expertise to Lebanon.  
During the war the support continued, and the support has continued after war as well.  Israeli 
intelligence estimated that during the war Iranian advisors were closely working with Hezbol-
lah.  It is estimated that the Iranian advisors helped Hezbollah create a command center for 
targeting and missile fire control thus increasing the Hezbollah capabilities.
100
  Without the 
support from Iran and Syria, Hezbollah could not have built its military capabilities prior to 
the war, nor could it have maintained its forces during the war either.  This demonstrates the 
importance and effectiveness of external support, a state sponsor, to an organization like Hez-
bollah. 
The Second Lebanon War demonstrates the capability of a non-state actor like Hezbollah to 
wage war successfully against an army like the IDF, study and deconstruct the vulnerabilities 
of Western style military and devise appropriate countermeasures.
101
  To do this, it mixed el-
ements of war to a cocktail of a hybrid war, and used these elements as force multipliers to its 
advantage.  A successful cocktail of hybrid war served by Hezbollah included advanced 
weapons, well trained troops in irregular warfare, use of the media to distribute self-profitable 
information, disregard of the lives of own and civilian casualties, the inclusion of a strong re-
ligious background and last, but not least, the knowledge of the opponent with the inclusion of 
political and military capabilities and restrictions, and especially the opponent’s moral limita-
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tions.  Just the kind of “Hybrid War” Hoffman describes as a “blend of lethality of state con-
flict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare.”102  The future adversaries 
will have organizations of a hybrid kind, and the means by which to reach their respective ob-
jectives; they “will exploit access to modern military capabilities… and promote protracted 
insurgencies that employ ambushes, improvised explosive devices, and coercive assassina-
tions.”103  The Second Lebanon War serves as a good example, how to fight and to be suc-
cessful against a western military driven force, its lessons have been learned and studied by 
other organizations like Hezbollah.  These are the types of conflicts and perhaps the types of 
hybrid adversaries the western militaries will be faced with in the future. 
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3 THE MODIFIED MODEL OF IDENTIFYING A HYBRID AD-
VERSARY 
In this chapter the challenges related to the development of the concept of both hybrid threat 
and hybrid adversary will be discussed first prior to the introduction of the model.  This dis-
cussion is important background information for the thought process behind the model of 
identifying emerging hybrid adversaries created by MAJ Christopher O. Bowers of the US 
ARMY and further developed by the author into the modified model of identifying a hybrid 
adversary.   
3.1 Background 
The US Armed Forces faces situation where they prepare to carry out missions in the full 
spectrum of military operations.  This explains the interest in the Israeli experiences in the 
Second Lebanon War.  It can be argued that Hezbollah and the 2006 Second Lebanon War 
have already had a significant impact on the current and future US military thinking, doctrine, 
and capabilities, since it became the basis for General James Mattis, USJFCOM Commander 
to mandate “Effective immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor, or export the 
terms and concepts related to EBO [effects-based operations], ONA [operational net assess-
ment], and SoSA [system of systems analysis] in our training, doctrine development, and sup-
port of JPME.”104 It can also be said that from the American perspective Hezbollah and Ha-
mas provide insights into the challenges in the future warfare that the United States could face 
in the next 20 years.
105
 
Organizations in the “middle”, between irregular and state adversary, like Hezbollah, can cre-
ate conditions that are similar to High Intensity Conflicts (HIC) normally expected to be faced 
in conflicts with states against states.  Fighting successfully against a foe in the “middle”, 
would require “the forces with HIC skills to be used in lower scale (brigades) than in state-
on-state conflict” and “requires sophisticated combined-arms fire and maneuver”.106  Dr. 
Johnson discusses that the American military is becoming bipolar, highly capable in irregular 
and state warfare, and little in the middle.  The focus of the U.S. military is shifting away from 
active “world police” operations on behalf of its allies, such as long lasting campaigns in Af-
ghanistan or Iraq, to handing the responsibility to those nations with interests involved in the 
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conflict.
107
  But these types of conflicts may be confronted by the US military in the future, 
and thus there is a need to study and learn more of them.
108
 
Since the emergence of the terms hybrid warfare and hybrid threat, the discussion over the 
definitions of each term have been a numerous.  Multiple authors, scholars and soldiers have 
tried to come up with one that would work well, but all have had some deficiencies.  After the 
Second Lebanon War the discussion over the definitions even multiplied.  In 2009, precision 
was reintroduced by Hoffman and he defined hybrid threat as “any adversary that simultane-
ously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terror-
ism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political objectives.
109” The defi-
nition became of importance, because it was realized that hybrid threat as defined could or it 
should actually influence the decisions about the military capabilities needed to counter them.  
However, it was recognized that the vagueness of the terms “hybrid enemy”, “hybrid warfare” 
and “hybrid war” – meaning that due to the lack of official and accepted definition – they 
could be defined differently by any one, and this could lead to the development of the US 
Armed Forces based on false definition, which in turn, could blur the thinking of the security 
environment the US might face in the future.
110
   
In Hard Fighting:  Israel in Lebanon and Gaza, Dr. Johnson recognizes the importance of a 
clear assessment of the adversary’s capabilities while planning for the military means to deal 
with it.  Based on Israeli experiences, he then divides opponents into three categories accord-
ing to their military capabilities and comes with a conclusion that each level of opponent re-
quires different demands on the military forces to face them.  The demands for military forces 
required to face these opponents are out of the scope of this thesis, but the categories are not.  
He comes up with a “Capabilities-Based Model for Framing Current and Future Challeng-
es”.  In this model, he discusses adversaries, not threats, and divides them into three levels, 
namely non-state irregular, state-sponsored hybrid and state adversaries.  He discusses the typ-
ical features and military capabilities of each level adversary and then displays the different 
measures to be taken into account by the opposing military force to be successful against the 
level of adversary in question.  He also gives examples of organizations on each level based 
on the conflicts of the last 30 years.
111
   I will incorporate his descriptions of the features and 
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military capabilities of state-sponsored hybrid adversary to the model of identifying a hybrid 
adversary later in this chapter, and thus will not discuss them any further at this time.
112
 
Prior to the official US Armed Forces definition of a hybrid threat in FM 3-0: Operations 
Change 1, in 2011, most of the literature dealing with the issue concentrated on “what” and 
“who” are the hybrid threats.  None have dealt with really how to identify an organization de-
veloping into one, or what circumstances it would require for an organization to develop into 
one.
113
 Dr. Johnson touches the last question in his book mentioned in previous paragraph and 
provides valuable information regarding that issue.  Even if we look at the current definition 
in FM 3-0: Operations, it does leave us a bit dissatisfied. 
“A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, ir-
regular forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these forces and elements 
all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Hybrid threats combine regu-
lar forces governed by international law, military tradition, and custom with un-
regulated irregular forces that act with no restrictions on violence or their tar-
gets. These forces could include militias, terrorists, guerillas, and criminals. 
Such forces combine their abilities to use and transition between regular and ir-
regular tactics and weapons. These abilities enable hybrid threats to capitalize 
on perceived vulnerabilities making them particularly effective. ”114 
The definition above gives the reader answers to questions “what” and “who” – “What” being 
“…diverse and dynamic combination… governed by international law… act with no re-
strictions on violence or their targets… combine their abilities… regular and irregular tactics 
and weapons…” and “who” being “…regular forces, terrorists, criminal elements or a com-
bination these forces…”.  Practically the above definition covers almost everything that a mil-
itary force, in this case the US Armed Forces, might face in any given conflict involving one 
or more militant groups or a hybrid adversary for that matter, taking advantage of modern 
means and technology available.  As the definition is conclusive it has the problem of being 
difficult to get a hold of and take to practical use.  But the same problem lies with a number of 
studies related to the issue, as mentioned before.  The definitions of hybrid warfare and hybrid 
threat or hybrid adversary are too vague and theoretical.  To argue that an organization that 
uses multiple forms of warfare, and means of terrorism, criminality, guerrilla tactics and 
cyber-attacks to achieve its goals is hybrid, is too vague, because it can be expected that any 
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up to date organization will use any capabilities available to it to achieve its goals.  It is im-
portant to understand, as Bowers states in his article, “one needs to be cautious in simply de-
fining a hybrid adversary as any that engages in multiple forms of warfare, because this can 
include just about any organization from criminal gangs like MS-13 to German Wehrmacht.  
If everybody is hybrid, then nobody is.”115 
As discussed earlier, the need to define a hybrid threat, or rather, a hybrid adversary
116
 is im-
portant, because it could have implications on the development of the concepts of operation of 
armed forces in the middle range warfare.  To face a hybrid adversary in the battle field, to be 
victorious, one has to have the capabilities to defeat it.  There are not many groups in the 
world today with advanced military capabilities and organizational maturity that could be cat-
egorized as being a true hybrid adversary, because it is a state not easily achieved, which is 
why it would be useful to be able to detect one.  In particular, for a global power like the Unit-
ed States, with global political, economic and military interests, it would be useful to know 
the circumstances in which an organization develops into a hybrid kind and to be able to de-
tect these possible emerging hybrid organizations in advance in order to assist or to prevent 
them from developing into an ally or adversary of a hybrid kind.   
If you combine together the thoughts of MAJ Bowers and Dr. Johnson, you could come up 
with the following description of a hybrid adversary: 
A fully developed hybrid adversary will be able to transition between irregular or 
guerilla war, and highly conventional warfare in company- or larger-sized for-
mations at will.  It will be able to engage opposing military forces effectively at a 
distance, and force them to fight through an extended engagement area to get into 
the close fight.  It possesses standoff weapons, such as anti-tank guided missiles 
(ATGM), man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), rockets or anti-ship mis-
siles, and it has both the training to use them effectively and the supply chain to 
maintain the capability.   In addition, they will employ a wide range of other capa-
bilities including cyber, social media, secure communication, organized and trans-
nationally networked crime, and advanced technologies such as unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs). In the future, they may even utilize robots. Finally, to maintain 
and to develop its capabilities it either receives substantial external support from a 
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state sponsor or it has acquired its capabilities from an aftermath of a failing 
state.
117
  
Hybrid adversary does not only possess the kind of advanced weapons mentioned above, but 
it also has the capability to use them effectively.  It falls between an insurgent group and a 
modern state military and it usually maintains a somewhat loose and cellular structure, but “at 
will” it can operate in company- or larger size formations.  It develops over time in a specific 
and predictable ways.  This evolution was studied by Peter Underwood in his work “Pirates, 
Vikings, and Teutonic Knights”.  He finds that armed groups can develop from primitive 
bands with greed as motivation to mature organizations driven by fanatical ideology.  There 
are groups in the middle, which are in transition, still motivated by greed.  Eventually at some 
point in time these groups will realize that to be able to better implement their ideals or just to 
get a bigger stake in the economic, political or social order, they need more political and mili-
tary power, and thus they start seeking it. Underwood calls this “maturity” and notes that if the 
group is to move beyond a “routine criminal annoyance or fanatical fringe element,” support, 
open or tacit, from an existing government is needed.
118
 
From the discussion above, we can conclude that there are at least three necessary factors for 
the development of a hybrid adversary – capability, maturity and a state sponsor.  Two of 
these were introduced as core variables in the modified model of identifying a hybrid adver-
sary, namely capability and maturity.  State sponsor is included in the maturity core variable.   
The third core variable in the model is the terrain.  Next I will discuss the model in detail.    
3.2 The Model 
The purpose of the modified model of identifying a hybrid adversary is to create a simple tool 
that can help to identify whether an organization is a hybrid kind or whether it could develop 
into one provided that right circumstances prevailed.  This model examines the current 
knowledge and understanding of hybrid threats and their capabilities and then brings all this 
information together in one picture in the context of the three core variables mentioned before 
– capability, maturity and complex terrain.  All these variables are divided into sub-variables.  
Each of these sub-variables is defined and thus an organization can be measured according to 
these definitions.  The core variables and sub-variables are placed on a dartboard like picture.  
When an organization is being measured according to the model, the closer to the center of the 
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dartboard it qualifies in different entities, namely the light red and red areas; the more it can 
be judged to have the potential to be or to develop into a hybrid adversary.  Also we can see 
the entities it needs to develop that would enable it to become one. 
The model MAJ Bowers introduced in his article “Identifying Emerging Hybrid Adversaries” 
is in essence pretty much the same as presented here (Figure 2, page 15), with the exception 
that his model is divided into smaller entities and made it more measurable.  Another differ-
ence is that he used triangles to describe the core variables, and at the intersection of these tri-
angles was the “sweet spot” where the hybrid adversary was at its truest and most effective – 
with “maximum tactical, operational, and strategic effectiveness.”119  His picture with over-
lapping triangles was descriptive, but with the lack of visible and clear both core and sub-
variables it was difficult to measure the levels on them.  Thus I decided to place these core 
and sub-variables on a dartboard type figure divided for each variable.  I lost the “sweet spot”, 
but in return got two zones, lighter red and darker red zones that are easier to measure and 
more visual.  In both models, there is an “out-of-bound” area, tips of the triangles and the 
bull’s eye in the dartboard.  In this area, it can be said the organization loses its edge of being 
hybrid and it has gone beyond the range of being a hybrid adversary, and sunk perhaps in the 
bureaucracy and “going through the motions” type of a national army. 
Any group measured on the model can move up and down the scale on each sub-variable, 
meaning that a position of a hybrid adversary can be attained and it can be lost.  None of the 
definitions of the sub-variables are constant; rather they are constantly changing over time.  
With the model these changes can be seen and then the threat level as well as development of 
the organization being measured estimated. 
In the next sub-chapters the modified model of identifying a hybrid adversary is presented.  
While defining variable and sub-variable the definitions of both MAJ Bowers and the author 
are incorporated in.  Since Hezbollah may be considered the best example of a hybrid adver-
sary at this time, it is used as an example on each of the variables and sub-variables while ex-
plaining the model in the following sub-chapters. 
3.2.1 Capability 
As discussed earlier, capability is one of the core variables, and capabilities play an important 
role while determining a hybrid threat.  Thus an organization considered to be a hybrid adver-
sary needs to possess at least some capabilities usually associated with modern national mili-
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taries.  In this model, for an organization to be credited of having a capability, it is expected to 
retain all three following entities: 
- Weapon: A particular type of weapon or technology in substantial numbers (e.g. 
ATMG, MANPADS etc.) 
- Training: Training to use them effectively. 
- Sustainability: The capability to maintain sustainability.120 
Based on this for a group to have a capability it needs to have substantial numbers of a partic-
ular weapon (e.g. MANPADS); in order to use them effectively, they must have received 
training for that particular weapon and tactics in its use; they must have figured out how to re-
supply the expended MANPADS to maintain the capability.  If one of these factors does not 
materialize, then the groups MANPADS are more of an “event” rather than a capability.121 
3.2.1.1 Weapon 
The three sub-variables introduced can be split into smaller entities within each sub-variable.  
MAJ Bowers split “weapon” in the following manner moving from the lower end of the spec-
trum to the center of the dartboard:  
- Small arms  
- Ineffective indirect fire (IDF) and/or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
- Explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) 
- Effective IDF (rockets, mortars) 
- ATGMs and/or MANPADS 
- Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)122   
Any group of bandits can get a hold of small arms and use them effectively to their advantage, 
but to have rockets, or mortars or ATGMs is far more difficult and it can be expected that a 
group with such weapons is fairly developed in many ways.  If we look at Hezbollah, we can 
say that based on the Second Lebanon War it had all but WMDs, which are considered to be 
only in the arsenal of national militaries due to the extensive costs and amount of rare and 
specialized expertise needed to develop and maintain that capability.
123
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3.2.1.2 Training 
To make training measurable, I split it from the lower end on as follows:   
- No training at all. 
- Occasional training (received time to time, from state sponsor, or other organization 
co-operated with referring to some particular issue or exchange of expertise e.g. weap-
on, building a suicide bomb belt). 
- Continuous training (aimed to maintain and improve the level of current capabilities). 
- A comprehensive training program (aimed to maintain current level and to increase the 
level and number of capabilities available, combining other capabilities together to get 
better results - combined). 
Hezbollah can be concluded to have an extensive training program due to the results of the 
Second Lebanon War.  For example, it could fight very effectively; use its singular weapons 
in concert with other weapons (mortars, ATGMs, rockets, mines, IEDs etc.) in a manner that 
required tactical thinking.  It could engage the IDF with its ATGMs and mortars from a dis-
tance up to 5 km.  It had expertise to use SIGINT, HUMINT and even IMINT for targeting.   
These are the kind of elements that do not surface without conducting extensive training and 
time.  Hezbollah had done that, with the help of its state sponsors, Iran and Syria.  It had taken 
advantage of the time and support available from its sponsors to develop a comprehensive 
training program.
124
  
3.2.1.3 Sustainability 
In order to maintain a capability one must be able to sustain it.  It is not enough to have, let’s 
say 50 ATGMs.  They need to be distributed to the fighters using them, a resupply must be se-
cured from some source to maintain the number of weapons after some or all are expended 
and in case they are not used immediately, they must be stockpiled in a manner that is required 
by a particular weapon for it to function accordingly after taken out of storage.  This requires a 
logistical chain.  Thus I identified three key elements of sustainability:  
- Resupply (availability to the organization) 
- Storage 
- Distribution (to the fighters).  
In order to make these three elements measurable, I chose the criteria to move from the lower 
end of the measured sub-variable to the center in the following manner: 
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- One timer (for one reason or another, an organization gets a hold of particular weapon; 
single case, no continuation). 
- Ad hoc (weapons are dealt with as they appear to the hands of the organization with 
the expectation of something more to come; planning of other key elements, but re-
supply). 
- Limited (all key elements planned to some extent; expectation of more to come).  
- Partial (all key elements are planned; but not to full extent) and  
- Full sustainability (all key elements are planned to full extent).   
Prior to the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah was estimated to have some 15,000 rockets of 
different kind and hundreds of ATGMs.  All these were accumulated over the years after the 
Israeli withdrawal in year 2000.  They were stored and distributed to the fighters during the 
preparations of the positions to face the IDF prior to the war.  Most of these rockets and 
ATGMs were supplied to Hezbollah by its state sponsors, Iran and Syria.
125
  The sheer num-
bers were so high, and the storage and distribution had been taken care of that during the con-
flict, as short as it was, resupply was not an issue to diminish either capability.  The fact that 
Hezbollah could maintain a substantial daily firing rate of 90-150 rockets to Northern Israel 
throughout the war and was able to use ATGMs in large quantities at a time suggest that large 
numbers were pre-delivered to the firing units.
126
  After the conflict Hezbollah has had the 
possibility to replenish its supply of these weapons, and other weapons as well.  Thus we can 
conclude that with Hezbollah full sustainability was reached.
127
 
The kind of capabilities (weapon, training, sustainment) discussed above can be acquired by 
organizations from state sponsors and perhaps failing states.  A failing state’s military could 
easily possess capabilities associated with national armies and as a result of the failure of its 
nation, it could either offer its services and capabilities to other organizations or form an or-
ganization of its own with  hybrid qualities and begin to support its own agenda.  Weapons of 
mass destruction could end up in the hands of a hybrid organization in the scenario of a state 
collapse. As mentioned earlier, WMDs are unlikely to become a capability among hybrid ad-
versaries due to the specialized skills needed and huge costs to sustain it.  Also the response of 
the other world nuclear powers would be unpredictable and it could work to the disadvantage 
of the hybrid organization.
128
 
For the acquisition of modern military capabilities (including training and support), it can be 
said that for an organization of hybrid nature, the best way to acquire these capabilities is from 
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a state sponsor.  It is not an issue of money – modern military capabilities are not sold to the 
highest bidder.
129
  It must be noted too that a state sponsor is not likely to support its proxy 
unless it feels the proxy is generating enough of desired results.  Namely, the proxy needs to 
operate for the benefit of its supporter, assisting to meet its strategic ends.  State sponsor is not 
going to hand out state of the art military equipment and support to its proxy unless that pre-
condition is satisfied.  In the case of Hezbollah, it can be said that it is a state proxy supported 
strongly by Iran.  Iran has provided it with capabilities associated with a hybrid threat.
130
  
Bowers brings up another Iranian supported Shiite extremists affiliated with Jaysh al-Mahdi in 
Iraq that never received such level of support as Hezbollah did as far as capabilities were con-
cerned.  The support was left at the level of explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), some 
training and technical support.
131
  There is a huge difference in the level of support between 
these two organizations, and to explain that one must estimate the differences of these organi-
zations and their abilities to use these capabilities.  If a proxy is provided with a capability, 
how much effort would it take from the state sponsor to have that capability effectively used 
and how would that work for the benefit of the sponsor?  This promotes the conception of the 
importance of the state sponsor interests being met, when the potential of some organization 
to receive substantial support from a state sponsor is examined.  “No state wants to invest re-
sources in a proxy organization that cannot or will not predictably assist in achieving its stra-
tegic ends.”132 
Looking at Hezbollah again from the Iranian perspective, it serves as the only true success of 
Iranian exported Islamic revolution.  It allows Iran to show influence in the Middle East re-
gion thus diminishing the historic tensions of Sunni Arabs and Shia Persians and directly in-
fluence a conflict with Israel – a Jewish state.  Most important, Hezbollah’s military capabili-
ties serve as a component of deterrence against a possible Western attack (including Israel) to 
the Iranian nuclear facilities.  Hezbollah and Southern Lebanon can be considered an Iranian 
established bridgehead against Israel and thus increase its retaliatory options in case of an at-
tack against it.
133
  From this we can conclude that for Iran, supporting Hezbollah is a strategic 
investment.  To make sure this investment is on track, Iranian forces conduct surprise inspec-
tions to assess Hezbollah’s readiness.134  
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3.2.2 Maturity 
As Underwood pointed out that as armed groups mature they tend to start moving on the scale 
of maturity and focus less on short-term profit seeking, and more on attaining political power 
and military capability to promote their ideals.  Group maturity is an important factor in be-
coming a hybrid actor.  It is one of the core variables in this model and it can be divided into 
the following sub-variables: 
- Strategy: Extent to which a group is goal-oriented with an effective strategy 
- Degree of organization and cohesion 
- Responsiveness to internal leadership and foreign state sponsors 
- Depth of leadership135  
MAJ Bowers had included population support to this core variable, but I moved it to the third 
core variable, complex terrain, because there is already a sub-variable called human terrain 
and due to that, all human aspects are in the same location. 
3.2.2.1 Strategy 
Strategy is divided into smaller parts based on the extent of a group’s goal-orientation, and 
they are: 
- Settling old scores (e.g. family feuds; vengeance)  
- Making money (e.g. piracy, smuggling, providing security) 
- Ideology (or religion) 
- Provision and implementation of Doctrine (an established procedure how to do things 
to achieve desired results) 
- Provision and implementation of Strategy (a general, undetailed plan of actions to 
achieve a complex end state including a long period of time) 
If we look at a potential hybrid adversary, it starts to move to the potential range from ideolo-
gy on.  Ideology plays an important role in the development of organizational maturity.  As 
Bowers discusses that extreme ideologies may hinder the maturing process by being impracti-
cal due to the ideological restrictions.  Combined with uncontrollability, this on the other 
hand, discourages state sponsors on investing in a particular group.  According to Bowers, re-
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ligious organizations are “normally not sufficiently responsive to state sponsor’s strategic 
ends” and with extreme ideologies run the risk of losing popular support as well.136   
With Hezbollah it can be said the ideology or religion is well presented.  Strategy could be 
said to have been presented as early as June 1985, when it publicly manifested “Open Letter” 
in which it articulated its political goals and ideology, and listed a number of objectives to be 
achieved over time (it was updated on December 2009).
137
  The manner in which Hezbollah 
had organized its defenses in Southern Lebanon during the Second Lebanon War refers to the 
idea of them having some sort of a doctrine of how to carry out a fight with the Israeli Defense 
Forces (IDF).    
3.2.2.2 Degree of organization and cohesion 
The degree of organization and cohesion develops from the outer perimeter towards the center 
in the following manner (in the parenthesis I have included the unit size up to which it is like-
ly to operate, the number of men is an approximation): 
- Street gangs (team – 3 men) 
- Militias, organized crime (squad – 7 men) 
- Paramilitary organizations (platoon – 30 men) 
- Insurgents, rebels (company – 100 men) 
- Middle (Uniforms, doctrine, training - hybrid) (battalion 600 men) 
- National militaries (brigade - 4000 men, and larger) 
As an organization develops, so does its capability to operate in larger formations.  The small-
er units within the larger unit operate in concert with each other, making the larger unit more 
capable than the sum of the capabilities of its sub-units.  Once these types of organizations 
mentioned are capable of operating in unit sizes of a company or larger up to a battalion, at 
will, they start falling into the category of a hybrid adversary.  This is due to the fact that they 
have discipline, cohesion, good command and control (C2) capabilities, and they understand 
how to avoid enemy strengths.
138
 
These hybrid adversaries in the “middle” may have uniforms, training and a doctrine to distin-
guish them from the insurgents or rebels.  Cohesion is an important factor that brings the or-
ganization together and may attract state sponsor, and thus perhaps creating a possibility for 
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an organization to ascend to the next level.  As Dr. Johnson puts it “an insurgency with deep 
political roots and unified ideology, for example, might be more likely to pose a hybrid threat 
than might a warlord’s militia.”139 
Looking at Hezbollah, we can again say that it falls within that middle range of hybrid adver-
sary.  Hezbollah is not an insurgent group, rather a state-within-state.  Its cadre fighters wore 
uniforms; it had training programs, and doctrine to fight.  The manner, in which it had divided 
Southern Lebanon into sectors each consisting of 12-15 villages and the autonomy to carry on 
the fight each village had, provided that the communications were cut, implies a cellular na-
ture.  We could even argue Hezbollah used auftragtaktik, or “mission-type tactics”, which 
suggests the subordinates were well educated of the intents of the higher echelon and thus in-
fers to the high level of Hezbollah’s tactical thinking.  From this we can conclude that Hezbol-
lah had in this entity the qualities of a hybrid adversary. 
3.2.2.3 Responsiveness to internal leadership and foreign state sponsors 
This is a key sub-variable, when discussing the effectiveness of an organization.  Responsive-
ness to both internal leadership and foreign state sponsor plays an important role in gaining a 
sponsor.  As discussed earlier, a state sponsor has no interest in providing extensive support to 
an organization that is not responsive to its demands.  It may give it limited support, but state 
of the art modern military capabilities, needed to enter the zone of hybrid adversary, are not 
on that list.  If the responsiveness to internal leadership is poor, the organization probably 
lacks cohesion and discipline, and it is thus not capable of operating in larger size units, thus 
missing the level of a hybrid adversary.  I have split the responsiveness to internal leadership 
and external state sponsor in the following manner: 
- No sponsor 
- Uncontrollable (renegade factions) 
- Semi-responsive (rogue elements) 
- Responsive 
The hybrid range in this sub-variable goes between semi-responsive and responsive.  As men-
tioned earlier by Underwood and Dr. Johnson, state sponsorship is a prerequisite for an organ-
ization to develop into a true hybrid adversary.
140
  In order to gain and to maintain a state 
sponsor, an organization must demonstrate adequate level of responsiveness to the demands of 
a possible sponsor from the sponsor’s perspective, thus making itself an attractive investment 
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for the sponsor.  This means that it does not necessarily have to comply with everything the 
sponsor demands, but rather enough to offset the cost-benefit estimate of the sponsor. 
Organizations developing over time tend to have at one time or another, renegade factions or 
rogue elements not responsive to the internal leadership.  This can be a problematic to the de-
velopment of the organization, and thus in order to mature to the next level, an organization 
must eventually subdue the elements within the organization not acting towards the unified 
end state.  This sub-variable develops together with the depth of leadership introduced next.  
With Hezbollah, we can concur that it has been responsive over Iran’s long term goals and 
provides Iran with additional value thus making it a worthwhile investment to maintain.
141
 
3.2.2.4 Depth of leadership 
Depth of leadership implies there are fewer points of failure within the organization as far as 
leadership is concerned.  Key leaders and even entire units can be killed and captured with 
relatively minimal loss of overall capability.
142
  I split the depth of leadership into following 
elements: 
- Single leader:  Organization is led by single leader and no command structure. 
- Multiple leaders:  Multiple leaders, but rivalry among the leaders; command structure 
is primitive. 
- Limited command structure:  There is some kind of a command structure; replace-
ments planned to some degree. 
- Command structure:  Clear command structure throughout the organization; replace-
ments planned top-down. 
Hezbollah depth of leadership can be categorized in the developed end of the spectrum thus 
bringing it to the range of hybrid adversary. 
It is important to understand that “maturity” does not equal “time” in this model.  MAJ Bow-
ers brings forward an interesting idea that in order to fully mature, a hybrid adversary would 
have to survive the very conflict that gave birth to it.  This time prior to the next conflict 
would be critical breathing space during which it could “deepen its leadership, strengthen its 
organization, purge rogue elements and train its members”.  He also marks that this period 
will most likely involve “low-level irregular warfare, terrorism or similar activities”. Fur-
thermore it is a relief from the active operations of open warfare, yet serving as time to main-
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tain group’s ideology and political relevance in its own area of influence.143  All this can be 
applied to the development of Hezbollah from the year 2000 till 2006 – the withdrawal of Is-
raeli forces from Southern Lebanon in 2000 to the Second Lebanon War of 2006. 
3.2.3 Complex Terrain 
Terrain is the third core variable in the modified model of identifying a hybrid adversary.  All 
organizations are a product of their environment, and potential hybrid adversaries are no ex-
ception.  They are linked to the terrain in which they exist and operate.  MAJ Bowers argues 
that due to the complexity of the terrain, it may be “a critical factor in determining whether a 
true hybrid adversary can exist”.144  In this model, “terrain” is divided into the following sub-
variables: 
- Geographical Terrain 
- Human Terrain 
- Cyberspace 
The more complex the terrain, the less a modern state military can take advantage of its 
strengths, namely size, material and technology and more it has to be taken into consideration 
in every level of military operations, from the boots on the ground to the staff planners.  Thus 
it can be said complex terrain is inherently a critical factor in the confrontation of a hybrid ad-
versary and a modern state military. 
3.2.3.1 Geographical Terrain  
Geography plays an important part of any military operation.  It can have decisive effects on 
the outcome of a battle if not taken into account.  This is a known factor for any soldier re-
gardless of the level of operation, and is a proven point throughout the curse of history.  In this 
model, “geography” is divided in manner that illustrates the capability of a western military to 
use its advantages diminishing as moving from the outside of the dartboard to the center.  
These geographical areas are   
- High desert (an ideal battleground for mechanized military) 
- Flat farmland 
- Hills, villages 
- Forests, hills, mountains, cities 
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- Mega cities145 
As the operational area for an organization being examined falls into the category of hills, vil-
lages, forests, mountains and even cities, then according to this model we are falling into the 
range of a hybrid adversary.  In these kinds of environments, the western militaries are falling 
out of their “comfort zones”, meaning the way their militaries were designed to operate at 
their full effectiveness does not meet the environmental demands.  Armored forces are re-
stricted to roads, line of sights are shorter, geographical obstructions may hinder communica-
tions, recognition of friendly forces get more difficult, risk of collateral damage increases, 
more ground forces are needed to hold areas etc.  As you move towards the center of the dart-
board in this model, the more advantageous the geographical aspects turn for a defender.  
With Hezbollah, we can say that the geographical aspect falls into the category of hybrid ad-
versary.  We can also say that Hezbollah certainly had taken advantage of the geographical 
terrain and preparations to even improve the geographical aspect of the terrain for its ad-
vantage to meet the IDF in Southern Lebanon during the Second Lebanon War.
146
 
3.2.3.2 Human Terrain 
In this model, human terrain is divided into two categories: 
- Group Dynamics: Single dominant cultural group, multiple rival cultural groups, inter-
group conflict, urban sprawl, ethnic civil war.
147
 
- Support of Population: No support, minority support, majority support, full support. 
The human terrain can be seen to increase in complexity as you move from a single dominant 
cultural group to intergroup conflicts, urban sprawl and ethnic civil wars with multiple differ-
ently motivated groups fighting for whatever their cause from sheer profit to political power.  
A hybrid adversary will most likely be motivated by religion, ideology, and race, ethnic or 
other similar cohesive background, like a criminal organization (a drug cartel).  This kind of 
common background gives the organization the motivation to enter a conflict to achieve its 
goal of correcting something for the advantage of their group, whether it is a social “wrong” 
or to gain better market share.  Correcting a social “wrong” can provide the group with the 
support of the local population and thus provide it with time to time needed sanctuary and a 
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recruiting base.  This can be seen in insurgent groups.  They have close connections to the lo-
cal populace, and are often supported by them as well.
148
   
An urban sprawl or an ethnic civil war might fall beyond the range of a hybrid adversary, be-
cause of the complexity; it just might require too much effort from a group to develop into or 
to maintain itself as a hybrid adversary in that kind of an environment. 
Differently from MAJ Bowers’ original model, I also added the support of the population to 
this section, because in my opinion in fits here better keeping the human factors in the same 
sub-variable.  It also adds another important factor in the estimation of the human terrain from 
the perspective of the hybrid adversary examined depending whether it has popular support or 
not.  For a group to develop into a hybrid adversary, it will not be of its disadvantage to have 
the substantial support of the population within that area of its influence.  Thus, for the sake of 
this model, to be hybrid, a group is assumed to have the support of the majority of the popula-
tion. 
If we look at Hezbollah, it was born in a time of multiple groups and it survived the Lebanon 
War (1982-1985) comparable to an intergroup conflict/ethnic civil war, and it is now a single 
dominant cultural group in Southern Lebanon.  It can be said it holds at least the support of 
the majority of the people in the in Southern Lebanon.  Hence it can be said that Hezbollah 
falls partially in the range of hybrid adversary in this entity.  However, with Hezbollah, it has 
to be taken into account that it has received substantial support over the years from not just on 
external supporters, but two, Iran and Syria, as a result of which it is not entirely depended on 
the support of the local population. 
3.2.3.3 Cyberspace 
Ongoing area of active operations in these days in expanding measure is the cyberspace.  It is 
an area, the use of which can give the same leverage to an organization as does the geograph-
ical terrain and human terrain.
149
  According to United States Army’s Cyberspace Operations 
Concept Capability Plan 2016-2028 cyberspace is defined as follows: 
"A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interde-
pendent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, 
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telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers."
150
 
Cyberspace is an area with infinite numbers of possibilities to explore and to exploit the ene-
my’s vulnerabilities.  Especially the western societies (and militaries) have become very de-
pendent on the cyberspace in running the daily routines in the society (namely banking ser-
vices, distribution of electricity and water, logistic chains from the producer to warehouse to 
the retailer to the consumer, telephone networks, air traffic control, running of factories or nu-
clear power plants etc.).  Both the state militaries and the potential hybrid threats are develop-
ing capabilities in this area with variable success.  Cyberspace is an area with assured activity 
on both sides in a conflict of today.   
In this category, the hardware can be bought off-the-shelf, but the expertise in the software, 
system (internet or other) protocols, standards and services is harder to achieve.  To achieve a 
high level of capability requires a continuous effort, and once achieved, it can be lost very 
quickly if the resources are cut or limited for some reason and the developed expert personnel 
cannot be retained.  State actors have usually more resources than group actors, but with even 
smaller groups or even lone hackers can take advantage of this domain.  Physical strength is 
not the issues in cyberspace, but rather logic and innovation are, and by taking advantage of 
these two factors a substantial advantage in this area can be achieved by anyone.
151
 
It must be realized that the anonymity is typical of the attackers in Cyberspace.  That is also 
the issue with a hybrid adversary in this domain.  It can use cyberspace to its advantage and 
not necessarily be recognized to operate in cyberspace.
152
  The network operations may even 
be conducted by another group affiliated with or just sympathizing with the hybrid adversary, 
thus improving the hybrid’s potential dramatically, as was the case with the hacker group 
“Anonymous Online” siding with Hamas in November 2012.153  
Additionally, one must understand that cyberspace may be used by the adversary for the bene-
fit of the society as well, and not just to cause damage to a potential enemy.  Nonetheless, in 
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this model the use of cyberspace will be looked at from the perspective of motive, and activi-
ties are divided in the following manner from the hazardous activities to dangerous ones: 
- Cyber vandalism/hackers (e.g. causing harm, viruses, worms, etc.) 
- Cyber criminality (e.g. using for criminal purposes, raising funds) 
- Cyber espionage (e.g. gather intelligence in a clandestine manner) 
- Cyber terrorism (e.g. striking on critical civilian infrastructure) 
- Tactical Cyber Warfare (e.g. supporting on-going operations, information operations 
(INFO-OPS)) 
- Strategic Cyber Warfare (e.g. preplanned and prepared actions in cyberspace to dam-
age substantially opponents cyber infrastructure)
154
  
According to the model, moving up the ladder demonstrates increased requirements for the 
potential hybrid adversary, namely a higher level of quality of the attacks, more challenging 
targets, more resources required, and the higher level of capabilities required etc. 
There are some reports dating back to as early as 2002 suggesting that Hezbollah may have 
started developing capabilities in cyberspace, and that during the Second Lebanon War activi-
ty in cyberspace was demonstrated by actively providing its view of events and news regard-
ing the war.
155
  As of today, Hezbollah is a very active player in the area of cyberspace, but the 
focus seem to be more in the INFO-OPS and intelligence gathering area rather than building 
actual cyber striking capabilities.
156
 
3.3 Summary 
As seen in previous pages, most of the elements of the core variables and sub-variables are 
linked to each other in one way or the other.  Improving in one element requires the improve-
ment in another, and vice versa.  Some critical factors in developing into a hybrid adversary 
can be identified:  An external state sponsor, standoff weapons and complex terrain.  The geo-
graphical environment cannot be influenced by the developing organization, but the people 
within that area of operation can.  Also the state sponsor can be influenced, provided that the 
organization has something to offer for the benefit of the sponsor and thus making it an attrac-
tive long term investment, since hybrid adversaries don’t develop overnight.  Standoff weap-
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ons as a capability is something required from a hybrid adversary, but as discussed earlier, 
they are best acquired and maintained with the help of a state sponsor.  It remains to be seen 
whether cyberspace can become such domain that could offset some of the other factors intro-
duced in this model and become more important than it presently is in the model.  
Most of the successful insurgencies and irregular groups enjoy both an adequate geographical 
terrain and the support of the local populace thus giving potential hybrid adversaries more of a 
defensive nature than offensive.  It is unlikely that a hybrid adversary takes a truly offensive 
action against its neighboring states, since by doing so it may lose the advantages given to it 
by the complex human and geographical terrain.  This does not exclude terrorist attacks, rock-
et attacks, cyber-attacks or other tactical offensive actions against their opponent provided that 
they are capable of doing that.
157
 
In this chapter I have presented a modified model of identifying a hybrid adversary.  I have 
demonstrated the model with Hezbollah (see Figure 3, next page), and it is no surprise Hez-
bollah fits in the model well, since it has had a strong influence in the creation of the original 
model.
158
  Now it remains to be seen does this model work with Taliban. 
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Figure 3:  Hezbollah and the modified model of identifying a hybrid adversary 
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4 TALIBAN AND THE AFGHAN INSURGENCY 
“A Pashtun is never at peace, except when he is at war.”159 
This chapter will briefly explain the history of the development of Taliban as a part of the his-
tory of Afghanistan over the last 35 years.  It will be the foundation for the next chapter which 
will examine Taliban by using the hybrid adversary model introduced in chapter 3. 
4.1 Background 
The word taliban literally means “those who seek” and it refers to students of the religion of 
Islam participating in religious seminaries called madrasas.  These seminaries are scattered 
across Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Literally, the word itself has neither military nor political 
aspect to it.  However, it is better known and associated to a religious and political movement 
which emerged in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 1994.  The Taliban movement eventually formed 
the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) and ruled Afghanistan ruthlessly in 1996-2001.  It 
has been associated with the insurgency in Afghanistan in 2002 until today.  “Taliban” has 
been used in the media freely when referring to the Pashtun or other insurgents in general in 
Afghanistan, or as a generic term for all anti-government militias within region, including or-
ganizations operating in Pakistan.  This gives the false impression of that the insurgent 
movement in Afghanistan is a uniform organization, but rather a complex, multi-tribal move-
ment with a number of different actors and alliances.
160
 
The Taliban consists mostly of Sunni Muslim Pashtuns, which is the largest ethnic group in 
Afghanistan.  Its tribal area of influence stretches from the western borders with Iran across 
the country to the eastern borders with Pakistan.  The southern regions of Afghanistan, namely 
Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan and Zabul have always been considered a Taliban stronghold.  
The Pashtuns are an independent and have a fierce warrior legacy that has been tested success-
fully against foreign invaders a number of times over the course of history from Alexander the 
Great to Americans and their NATO allies.  The Taliban are known for their ultraconservative 
approach in social issues, politics, and to practicing Islam and Islamic Law.
161
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The “Neo-Taliban” term was first introduced by The Economist in 2003.  It refers to the Tali-
ban movement that emerged in 2002, differentiating it from the Taliban movement that 
formed the Afghan government in the 1990’s.  It has been used side by side with the term 
“Taliban” referring to the movement confronting the authority of the Afghan government and 
its efforts to build a nation.  This demonstrates the confusion over the identity and the makeup 
of this group.   “Neo-Taliban” conveys that the opposition of the Afghan government includes 
some characteristics of the old regime, but at the same time points to important differences of 
the two.  The latter has evolved beyond the old regime to encompass new groups with new 
agendas.
162
   
In this chapter I will examine the Afghan Taliban or the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan 
(IEA), and I will not include similarly named groups operating in Afghanistan or Pakistan, 
such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, unless it is relevant to prove a point.  I will either use the 
term Taliban or IEA when discussing the movement. 
4.2 The Birth of a Taliban Nation 
The rise of the Taliban as a force to reckon with in Afghanistan has roots firmly in the interna-
tional politics of the 1980’s and 1990’s.  It has been strongly shaped by Afghanistan’s ancient 
tribal culture, the Soviet invasion in 1979 and mujahedeen resistance, the civil war in the early 
1990’s following the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in 1989, the ideology planted in the 
madrassas, the initial hope for peace for the war-weary people of Afghanistan and their gov-
ernance, the downfall of the movement in 2002 and finally the on-going insurgency.
163
 
During the mid-1970’s Afghanistan was going through a stage of unsteadiness as a result of 
the ending of the four-decade rule of King Zahir Shah.  The People’s Democratic Party of Af-
ghanistan (PDPA) overthrew the existing government in 1978 and to support the newly estab-
lished communist regime and to counter the rise of radical Islam in the Muslim Central Asian 
countries, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979.  The PDPA issued so-
cialist reforms that were seen by the Afghan masses as “an assault to their traditional and Is-
lamic values”.  As a result, the religious sentiments and political conservatism were adopted 
for self-defense and resistance groups formed locally identifying themselves as “mujahedeen” 
– those who wage jihad.  Typical of a Cold War era war, the United States started backing up 
the resistance groups against the Soviet-backed communist government and thus Afghanistan 
became the battleground for two superpowers.  The support network for the resistance groups 
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involved other Arab nations as well as Pakistan.  Pakistan, bordering Afghanistan to the East, 
became the conduit of military and civilian aid to the resistance groups.  The close relation-
ship with Afghan groups and Pakistan was initiated.  Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence 
(ISI) agency (Directorate today) was awarded the monopoly over the distribution, training, and 
shipment of military and financial assistance to the resistance groups.
164
 
The mujahedeen resistance was met with a brutal counterinsurgency campaign by the Soviets, 
which fueled even more determined resistance among the Afghans.  Whereas the occupation 
of the large population centers and securing lines of communications were achieved quickly, 
the disarmament of the rural Afghan tribal warriors proved impossible.
165
  The Soviets were 
not able to assert their authority outside the bigger cities to the rural areas, where the poor in-
frastructure and the terrain prevented the effective use of their heavily mechanized forces, 
which were not meant for fighting a light guerrilla force conducting ambushes and raids in 
small groups using the terrain and circumstances to their advantage.
166
  Initial success against 
the mujahedeen strongholds was achieved by using large formations, but effects were only 
temporary, and as the Soviets could not deploy as many troops as would have been needed to 
control the country, it was an ineffective modus operandi in the long run.  As a result lighter 
units were needed, and were deployed to Afghanistan.  Initially the Soviet forces had an abso-
lute air-superiority over the resistance groups, since they had no anti-aircraft weapons other 
than small arms.  The Soviets exploited their air capabilities fully – bombing assumed huge 
proportions, convoys were protected by helicopters, which also facilitated rapid force move-
ments to gain initiative in case of an ambush or preventing one.  This was changed after the 
resistance groups received anti-aircraft weapons from their foreign supporters – guns and mis-
siles, specifically American Stingers, a man-portable air-defense system.  This forced the So-
viet air assets to become more cautious for the fear of casualties at the cost of the protection of 
the forces on the ground which again, became more vulnerable to the resistance group am-
bushes.  As the Soviet occupation lasted almost 10 years, 1.3 million Afghans were reported 
killed by the Soviets and the Afghan communist government, the rural and urban infrastruc-
ture of Afghanistan was destroyed, and approximately 5.5 million Afghans had fled to refugee 
camps in Iran and Pakistan.
167
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In 1989, following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the country was left divided into 
two main factions:  the communist government in Kabul backed by the Soviets and the muja-
hedeen groups led by conflicting groups backed by the Americans and other Arab states.  The 
Soviets continued to provide the communist government with materiel for another two years, 
but the communist government war forced eventually to step down in 1992 and there was an 
unsuccessful effort to form a coalition government among the mujahedeen groups.  Soon a 
civil war erupted.  Over the span of ten years the Afghan people were armed to the teeth with 
a number of resistance groups fighting for power.
168
  These armed mujahedeen groups with 
conflicting interests were now all craving for power.  The ten year long Soviet occupation, fol-
lowed by a five year long civil war had left the society fragmented, whereas it had previously 
been a society based on tribal laws and customs.  Now power was not based on tribal heritage, 
but rather military muscle.  Afghanistan had sunk into warlordism – “brutal suppression of the 
population, corruption, anarchy and lawlessness”.169   
It was in this set up that the Taliban first emerged as a player in the game in southern part of 
Kandahar Province in 1994.  There are several variations of the story of the emergence of Tal-
iban, but overall it can be stated that it was a local response to counteract against the former 
resistance and militia forces which were implicated in robbery, brutality against local resi-
dents, and offenses against local values such as “reputation” and “local honor with respect to 
women”.  Afghan people were tired of the war and Taliban offered a solution – peace and a 
return to an Islamic society governed by a strict interpretation of the Islamic Law (Sharia).   It 
quickly gained support and by 1997 it controlled 90-95% of the country.  It can be argued that 
the Taliban success was a combination of three elements:  The fragmented nature of the Af-
ghan society, the external support it received from Pakistan (ISI in particular) and other for-
eign nations, and thirdly the ability of Taliban itself to either assimilate or sideline other rival-
ing Pashtun leaders.  It had become the governing movement in Afghanistan and it formed the 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA).
170
 
As mentioned before, initially Taliban was greeted with enthusiasm and positive expectations 
by the Afghan population when they came and established their Islamic state.  The extremist 
version of the Islamic law was enforced.  Women’s rights were eradicated, shaving and trim-
ming of men’s beards was banned along with music, arts, literature, televisions, VCRs, satel-
lite dishes.  Public beatings of men and women, executions, stonings, and the amputation of 
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hands and limbs became routine practices.
171
  Taliban also repressed and even carried out 
atrocities against Afghan non-Sunni population, excluded them from the governmental offic-
es, making the government exclusively Taliban and thus distancing itself from the multi-tribal 
Afghan society.   Sharing the same ideology, it was at this time that the Taliban aligned itself 
with al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.  Al-Qaeda headquarters were based in Afghanistan, and 
al-Qaeda training camps were established – Afghanistan became the safe haven for global Is-
lamic extremists for both ideological and military training.  The refusal to expel Osama bin 
Laden, who was accused of participating in a number of terrorist attacks between 1998 and 
2000 further alienated Taliban from international community.  By 2001 much of Taliban’s 
support was lost both home and abroad.
172
  
4.3 From the Fall to the Insurgency 
The final chapter of the Taliban regime began as the al-Qaeda terrorists hit the World Trade 
Center twin towers and Pentagon on September 11, 2001.  The continued refusal to hand over 
bin Laden derived a swift retaliation from the United States.  By early October, 2001, the U.S. 
–led military intervention began with an air campaign against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in 
Afghanistan.  Mazar-e-Sharif, Kabul, and other major cities fell quickly to the hands of the 
United Front (aka Northern Alliance), an Afghan movement resisting Taliban in northern Af-
ghanistan, and to the people who were fed up with Taliban rule and bore arms to free the cit-
ies.  In December, the last stronghold of Taliban fell in Kandahar, and the majority of the Tal-
iban’s and al-Qaeda’s leadership escaped to Pakistan.  A new transitional government of anti-
Taliban Afghanistan was formed with a Pashtun politician Hamid Karzai named as the chair-
man.  The international coalition forces
173
 remained in Afghanistan to assist in the reconstruc-
tion and the stabilization of the country.  Despite the new government, its international sup-
port and the presence of the international coalition forces in the country, the effects of Tali-
ban’s Islamization were far from over, but rather a new stage was to begin.174 
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The remnants of Taliban that had fled to Pakistan began organizing and coordinating re-
sistance or, in other words counterinsurgency against the Karzai government.  The Islamist 
domination of local governments in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Feder-
ally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) in Pakistan kept alive the internationally oriented sup-
port system for the Taliban and al-Qaeda.  The Karzai government had been slow in achieving 
progress in reconstruction programs including social and economic development of the Af-
ghan population.  This combined with the fact that the Taliban “for ideological reasons never 
accepted defeat and thought it was their duty to fight on.”175  
In the spring of 2002 the remaining fighters of Taliban, al-Qaeda and other foreign Islamic 
fighter in Afghanistan were defeated by the U.S. supported Afghan forces in Shah-i-Kot Val-
ley (Operation Anaconda) in Eastern Afghanistan.  This was thought to be the last stance of 
the Taliban movement and those fighters who had not yet fled to Pakistan.
176
  As a result of 
this operation, Taliban went on to a stage of “hibernation177 only to resurface as a stronger 
force in 2006.  It is estimated that at this time Taliban had lost over 70% of its strength, ex-
cluding the leadership structure.
178
 
Between 2002 and 2006 Taliban withdrew to its sanctuary areas in Pakistan’s FATA and 
NWFP and remote areas in southern and southeast Afghanistan to gather momentum and 
strength.  During this phase Taliban reorganized and concentrated on gathering information on 
both OEF and ISAF forces.  Its fighters and religious instructors were inserted into the villag-
es of southern and eastern Afghanistan to get involved in regional politics, to preach radical 
Islam, to protect the increasing opium trade and most importantly to prepare the rural people 
of Afghanistan to their return.  It did no lay idle in Afghanistan either; towards the end of 
2002 the insurgency grew more organized as attacks increased in number, geographical distri-
bution and sophistication.  Infrequent ambushes against the government or coalition forces by 
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small groups with small arms grew to frequent use of road side bombs and larger units (up to 
150 men) by the end of 2002 and 2003 onwards.  Reports of Taliban strongholds in southern 
and southeastern Afghanistan emerged as a sign of increased activity.  Since 2005 intimida-
tion and assassinations of local police officers, government officials and village elders co-
operating with the Americans were frequently used as methods of persuasion of the local pop-
ulation to support Taliban, and to make it known they are returning.  In 2006 Taliban inserted 
thousands of fighters from Pakistan to southern Afghanistan to establish bases of operation 
and their authority in the absence of an official government authority.  At a district and pro-
vincial level shadow governments were formed and Taliban began to dispense justice over the 
local disputes in the absence of a government judicial system.    The aim for Taliban was to 
deny the coalition and government legitimacy and thus undermine their authority.
179
   
It is estimated that Taliban had generated a force of at least 12,000 fighters to southern parts 
of Afghanistan, and in particular to the district of Panjwayi some 35 km West of Kandahar 
City by August 2006.  Their size and defensive posture suggested they were to stay; moreover 
a force of that size posed a threat to Kandahar City, the birth place of Taliban, to be attacked.  
The coalition forces responded with launching Operation Medusa to defeat Taliban.  In a two 
week battle in September 2006 the Taliban forces were defeated and their effort to use con-
ventional warfare to fight the coalition forces proved ineffective, and it was forced to retrieve 
to its previous modus operandi, namely guerrilla warfare.  However, during Operation Medusa 
the coalition forces met a far more skillful and better prepared enemy than they expected.  
Highly motivated Taliban operated in teams of 20-30 men (roughly a platoon size), they were 
capable of conducting reliefs-in-place, carry out coordinated attacks and counterattacks, they 
took advantage of the natural and man-made obstacles and terrain, the defensive positions had 
interlocking lines of fire with small arms, rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and recoilless ri-
fles, in addition the indirect mortar fire was responsive and well-coordinated, even existing 
canal had been widened to make it an obstacle for a tank.  LTCOL Shane Schreiber, a Canadi-
an operations officer concluded that “the Taliban had a battalion defensive position fully dug 
in with complex robust command and control capability with mutually supporting positions 
and advanced surveillance and early warning.”  Interestingly enough it was also noted that 
these positions resembled Soviet defensive positions.
180
   
Although Taliban was incapable of matching the coalition forces in conventional warfare and 
suffered losses in September 2006, it certainly made its presence clear for the people of Af-
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ghanistan and that it is not to be forgotten as a credible actor in Afghanistan.  It can be argued 
that for the sake of delivering that message it was necessary for Taliban to engage the coali-
tion forces in that magnitude.  It reverted back to using asymmetric tactics with considerable 
success – small groups and sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and not-so-
common in Afghanistan (until then), suicide attacks.  In the spring of 2007 the insurgency re-
sumed full strength and spread to the western and northern parts of the country.  By the end of 
2007 the insurgent activities reached Kabul.  The Afghan government, coalition forces and 
even UN buildings were targeted.  The increase in the Taliban activity can be seen in the Fig-
ure 3 below as well as the effectiveness of IEDs, Taliban’s weapon of choice, as a cause for 
coalition casualties.
181
 
 
Figure 4: Coalition Fatalities 2001-2013
182
 
 
While waging a full blown insurgency in Afghanistan, at the same time Taliban also estab-
lished a shadow state that by the end of 2009 covered 33 provinces out of 34.  The effective-
ness of Taliban insurgency can be seen by looking at the development of the formulation of 
shadow governments in the country.  In 2005 only 11 provinces primarily in the southern and 
southeastern Afghanistan were shadow-governed by Taliban, the following year 20 out of 34 
provinces and in 2007 the number of provinces was up to 28 compared to 2009 when the 
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number of Taliban shadow governments was up to 33 covering almost the entire country.  In 
these provinces Taliban set up functional courts, assessed and collected taxes.
183
  The success 
of Taliban can be partly credited for the lack of Karzai government and ISAF forces ability to 
provide security for the Afghan people – the provision of security is one of the primary means 
by which governments protect, control and gain legitimacy over their populations.  The Af-
ghan people trusted neither the Karzai government nor ISAF to provide these basic needs ex-
pected from a legible government.  This lack of credibility on the other hand increased the 
number of volunteers willing to serve the Taliban.  Moreover, as the Taliban’s influence in-
creased in Afghanistan, during all this time the Pakistani sanctuaries provided it with both 
shelter and training camps to further improve its capabilities.  Combined with the tribal nature 
of Afghanistan’s society, severely restricted terrain, and lack of infrastructure, it was (and still 
is) difficult for the central government to project power and control its population through le-
gitimate bureaucratic functions. Thus, in large parts of Afghanistan, the Taliban was (and still 
is) able to control the population and provide an outlet for the population’s demands.184 
To counter this new ever increasing volume of Taliban activity and influence in Afghanistan, 
a new strategy was needed.  In 2010 the Obama Administration began executing a new strate-
gy outlined by General Stanley McChrystal, the ISAF commander.  His plan consisted of four 
main pillars:  Developing a significantly larger and more effective Afghan National Security 
Force (ANSF), prioritization of good governance acceptable to the Afghan people, gaining 
initiative and reversing the insurgency’s momentum by taking the fight to the enemy and pri-
oritizing resources to critical areas.  To succeed in these tasks additional resources were need-
ed and allocated as well.  This was a change to ISAF strategy that had previously been mostly 
defensive in nature, valuing the protection economic corridors and development projects 
against the threat level rather than the actively engaging the enemy.
185
  An upswing of Ameri-
can troops was seen deployed to Afghanistan; 17,000 combat troops and 4,000 U.S. military 
personnel to train the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF).  Other ISAF nations were not 
as eager to commit more combat troops to Afghanistan as the Americans were.  Due to suc-
cessive surges from July 2009 to July 2011 the U.S. troop contribution to ISAF had increased 
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from 30,000 to approximately 90,000 U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan compared to the 
nominal increase of 35,000 to 42,000 troops from other coalition countries.
186
 
In 2009 and 2010, since Central Helmand River Valley and Kandahar had always been strong 
areas of support for Taliban, GEN McChrystal set ISAF main effort to clear these areas of 
Taliban influence.  By doing this, it was estimated that the Taliban insurgency could not per-
sist in a meaningful form and it would support the Afghan government’s efforts to display 
both political authority and control of territory, which could not be said if Taliban showed 
strong presence in the area.  By the end of 2010 the new strategy on Afghanistan seemed to 
work; Taliban had lost its strongholds in Helmand and in Kandahar and it appeared that insur-
gency was losing momentum and those regions appeared to become more Afghan government 
and coalition friendly thus reversing the insurgency.
187
   
The strong and active presence in the southern parts of Afghanistan proved officially a suc-
cessful strategy, which has eventually led to the downsizing of the U.S. troops in the country 
and the claims that the surge of troops and the new strategy worked.  Whereas the southern 
parts of Afghanistan did calm down, namely Helmand and Kandahar, other parts did not since 
similar operations were not carried out in other provinces.  Contrary to the official standpoint 
regarding success in Afghanistan, namely statistics on Enemy-initiated attacks (EIA) by ISAF, 
IED attacks by ISAF, casualties inflicted on the civilians by United Nations (UN) and terrorist 
attacks and related deaths in Afghanistan by National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) all 
prove otherwise.  All of the mentioned statistics show the level of Taliban activity is currently 
considerably higher than it was in 2008 before the surge began.
188
  There are predictions and 
allegations that some ANSF units prepare for the return of the Taliban as the majority of the 
ISAF troops are leaving after 2014 by making deals with the Taliban; such as not shooting at 
them or being shot back, or if arresting a Taliban member, releasing him soon.
189
  The fact 
that the number of civilian casualties is increasing, is disturbing, and it does neither support 
the fact that Taliban is losing momentum nor that the transition process is on track, nor that 
ANSF or ISAF are providing security for the Afghan people.  Moreover, whereas ISAF’s mis-
sion has been stated to come to an end at the end of 2014 and the ANSF taking over the role 
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of providing security, it can be expected to become an arduous or impossible task, and sug-
gests that the tale of Taliban is far from over.  Whether Taliban will move on to an offensive, 
once ISAF operation ends in 2014 or not remains to be seen, but based on the statements of 
IEA the first is more probable. 
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5 TALIBAN AND THE MODEL  
In this chapter Taliban is placed under the examination according to the modified model of 
identifying a hybrid adversary introduced in chapter 3.  The focus will be on Taliban as an or-
ganization from its rise to power in the mid 1990’s until today.  Nonetheless, if needed, we 
will go back in time to demonstrate a particular point. 
5.1 Capability 
Capability was one of the core variables of the model.  It was to consist of a particular, prefer-
ably a standoff weapon in substantial numbers, training to use it effectively and the sustaina-
bility of that particular weapon in the arsenal of the group being in question for an extended 
period of time.  Looking at Taliban, we can say that as of now it lacks a standoff weapon (or 
weapons) such as Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) or Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems 
(MANPADS) that Hezbollah possesses and uses effectively.
190
 On the other hand, since late 
2006 and the aftermath of Operation Medusa, Taliban has used its weapon of choice, an im-
provised explosive device (IED) very effectively and has done so for an extended period of 
time.
191
  The ability to increase the annual number of IED attacks from 2008 to 2011
192
, and to 
maintain that high level suggests that the supply chain must be well organized and functional.  
This also suggests that there must be at least occasional training received by the Taliban fight-
ers from either their own ranks or another organization entirely.  This is supported by the evi-
dence that al-Qaeda operatives and Iraqi mujahedeen have trained Taliban fighters from time 
to time in weapons-making, material, financing, new types of tactics (such as suicide bomb-
ing) and technologies, namely those they had learned in Iraq.
193
  There are also accusations of 
Pakistani Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) giving Taliban indirect and direct 
support in the form of military equipment, weapons, trainers and advisors.
194
 
This training aspect is also supported by the video releases on the IEA internet pages, such as 
the latest one “Lets Prepare Ourselves” from May 27, 2013, where Taliban fighters are filmed 
in live ammo exercises and demonstrating their skills in hand to hand combat situations.  As 
much of propaganda as these videos are, they still create the image to the local Afghan people 
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that Taliban is to some extent systematically training its fighters.
195
  By looking at the modus 
operandi of Taliban against the ISAF since 2007 from the training perspective, this model 
suggests that Taliban would categorize as having a training program aimed at improving cur-
rent level of capabilities, because it has used the same modus operandi, namely IED and sui-
cide attacks at an increasing rate and effectiveness for so long.  On the other hand, if we look 
at the capabilities Taliban demonstrated during Operation Medusa in September 2006,
196
 I 
must also conclude accordingly.  Taliban demonstrated a capability to fight in a conventional 
manner, although unsuccessfully against ISAF, but proving a point that it can do that.  It did 
so – at will – which is a precondition for a hybrid adversary.  The manner in which way Tali-
ban fighters fought suggests training for conventional warfare was conducted and incorporated 
in the battle plan.  This proven capability of conventional warfare may prove to be the new 
modus operandi of Taliban once the ISAF operation comes to an end in 2014 and if Taliban 
chooses to begin offensive actions to reclaim power in Afghanistan.
197
 
Thus according to the model I would categorize Taliban reaching in the training aspect the 
level of “continuous” training, in the sustainability to “Limited” level and last, in the weapon 
aspect to the “IEDs, ineffective IDF” level, which could easily be upgraded to the “Effective 
Indirect Fire (IDF)” level based on the experiences of Operation Medusa.  Thus Taliban is 
within the range of a hybrid adversary in the capability core variable, except for one sub-
variable – the “Weapon”. 
5.2 Maturity 
The second core variable of the modified model of identifying a hybrid adversary is Maturity. 
It can be divided into following sub-variables: strategy, degree of organization and cohesion, 
responsiveness to internal leadership and external sponsor and finally the depth of leader-
ship.  In chapter 3, it was suggested that perhaps the organization being examined according to 
the model should have survived the very conflict that gave birth to it.  This condition is ful-
filled, and even exceeded with Taliban – as it was with Hezbollah.  Taliban survived the Af-
ghan civil war in the mid 1990’s and established Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan; it was later 
overthrown from power by Northern Alliance and international coalition forces.  It survived 
the removal from power; it began an insurgency, and has survived a number of different strat-
egies and surges of ISAF troops over the last ten years.  It formed shadow governments in al-
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most all Afghan provinces regardless of the ISAF operations and to emphasize its role as an 
important player in Afghanistan in the years to come after the end of ISAF it opened an office 
in Qatar and is supposed to begin peace talks by the end of the year 2013.
198
  One could argue 
that the fact that Taliban could open the office in Qatar under the name of Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan gives it recognition and an official member status in the talks regarding the future 
of Afghanistan.  On the other hand, it would be self-deception thinking of a functional solu-
tion in Afghanistan without Taliban being part of it.   
5.2.1 Degree of organization and cohesion 
The degree of organization and cohesion within the Afghan insurgency is anything but easy to 
explain.  The motivations and backgrounds of the Taliban and other insurgent fighters can 
vary greatly ranging from “hard-core” ideologically driven madrasa students or village recruits 
driven by xenophobia to “non-core” local independent militias driven by variety of motivation 
or pure mercenary elements driven by money.  These categories and motivations overlap and 
it is imperative to understand that the Afghan insurgency is a complex network of actors with 
a variety of interests.  Taliban could organizationally be called “a network of networks”.  The 
composition of different networks (e.g. Haqqani, Mansur, Khales) is stressed beyond the clan, 
tribal and regional boundaries to different provinces.  This makes the structure cross-woven 
and complicated.  On local level the Taliban fighters are of the same tribe or their subgroups.  
According to some estimates some 80 to 90 percent of these fighters operate in or close to 
their own communities.
199
   
Over the years there have been surprisingly few power struggles among various groups or 
challenges over the leadership of the organization, namely challenging the leadership of Mul-
lah Omar, the spiritual leader of Taliban.  Those attempts and movements have been tempo-
rary and quickly absorbed back to the organization.  Defections from Taliban over to the Kar-
zai regime have been rare, but verified.  This could result from the fact that the Taliban gov-
ernment was more diverse and had more “moderates” holding office than the Taliban led in-
surgency did.  Moreover, the treatment given to a dissident leader, Mansur Dadullah in late 
2007, served as an example of the treatment of those who do not comply with the principles of 
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the IEA.   Taliban sacked him publicly, announced his removal from his position and some 
say gave his position over to the coalition forces, which launched an attack to kill him.
200
 
Although Taliban claims the insurgency is a unified effort of all Afghans, there are other Af-
ghan groups allied to Taliban for a variety of reasons.  The IEA propaganda claims the 
Haqqani and Khalis networks, both dating back to the mujahedeen resistance of the Soviet oc-
cupation and both being allied with the Taliban government, as part of their forces.  Yet both 
have retained their separate identities, meaning they issue their own statements separate from 
the IEA’s official channels. The Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), also dating back to the Sovi-
et occupation, holds a different political stand and ideology than Taliban, but has joined the 
insurgency, and thus makes it an ally of pragmatic kind to the Taliban that is not to be criti-
cized too much to maintain the unified front of the insurgency.
201
  This just demonstrates that 
changing of alliances has been a common feature of the Afghan war-fighting; alliances are 
formed out of necessity or interests of some kind and as they change, so may the alliances 
change.  However, Taliban has managed to create the kind of cohesion among itself and its 
Afghan allies to make it a credible player in Afghanistan in the past, now and in the future. 
Another issue to evaluate in the model in the sub-variable organization & cohesion was the 
ability to operate different size units.  Over the years Taliban has demonstrated a capability to 
adapt its modus operandi according to its foe and its success in battle.  It has used guerrilla 
tactics; IEDs, suicide bombings, small arms fire, mortars, and rocket propelled grenades and 
even tried conventional warfare.  It has operated in small teams, in larger units up to 150 men 
or even battalion size defensive positions against ISAF in Operation Medusa as described by 
LTCOL Shane Schreiber in chapter 4.
202
  In the light of this information, according to the 
model I would categorize Taliban falling in the insurgent, rebel range.  Regardless of the ac-
tions demonstrated during Operation Medusa and the recent training video (“Lets prepare our-
selves”)203 in which the trainees all appear in uniforms to create an image of a developed 
training organization, the lack of large scale operations in the near history retain Taliban in the 
lower level and not bring it to the middle range. 
5.2.2 Leadership  
Taliban is said to have one or more leadership councils (shuras) in Pakistan.  The most im-
portant one is the so called “Quetta Shura” based in the vicinity of the city Quetta in north-
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western Pakistan.  The spiritual leader of Taliban, Mullah Omar, is believed to locate in Quet-
ta.   Taliban denies that any of its leadership is located in Pakistan.  It is difficult to get an ac-
curate picture of the nature and the composition of the Taliban leadership structure from open 
sources due to inconsistencies and insufficient and even contradictory information.  This 
could result from Taliban’s intentions of hiding information and thus serving their propaganda 
purposes.  However, it can be said that Taliban organization has developed over time, as do all 
organizations.  What can be said for sure is that Mullah Omar is still the leader, and the rest is 
unconfirmed, but it could consist of the Omar’s deputy, two shuras (military and legislative) 
and a number of committees (finance, media, preaching, recruitment etc.)  Taliban leadership 
is more than just a collection of guerrilla leaders; they have mechanisms and resources to car-
ry out political and media campaigns.
204
   
The amount of influence the Taliban leadership has in the field level is difficult to measure.  
Undoubtedly in some areas the local commanders are acting on their own without the guid-
ance of central leadership whereas in others the influence of central leadership is stronger.  
However, it can be said that the role of Taliban leadership in the initiation of the insurgency 
was strong.  The recognition of Mullah Omar as the leader of Taliban by Karzai government, 
number of local and regional Afghan actors, the U.S. or even al-Qaeda, suggest that Mullah 
Omar has strong influence over his fighters and the participants of the insurgency in general.  
The day-to-day command and control of the Taliban commanders in Afghanistan may be lim-
ited due to long distances and inexistent secure communication channels, yet the field com-
manders are capable of operating effectively.  There is evidence of issued directions and 
guidelines, a “Code of Conduct” (layeha) so to speak, to have been distributed to local com-
manders in 2006, where guidelines for fighting were issued.  It is not clear whether these 
guidelines were actually to be followed or was it just a show of propaganda to illustrate the 
“power” and legitimacy of IEA.  Also there are stories of local Taliban commanders refraining 
from kidnapping an international journalist in 2006 due to orders given from Quetta.
205
  This 
suggests that the Taliban higher level orders and rules are followed, at least to some extent, by 
the local Taliban commanders leaving them with lots of autonomy.
206
  
As discussed earlier the position of Mullah Omar as the leader seems solid and the other 
groups taking part in the insurgency are kept in line with the Taliban, and there are only few 
defections from the organization.  Those individuals who choose to disagree with the objec-
tives of IEA are either brought back in line or removed from their position, perhaps in the 
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harshest way as was the case with Mansur Dadullah mentioned earlier.  Year after year Tali-
ban has been able to replace its leaders at all levels of those who have been killed or captured 
by the raids and attacks carried out by the international coalition forces.  Regardless of these 
losses, it has regenerated the command structure and carried out attacks with high intensity 
over the last few years.  This suggests that Taliban has a developed command structure taking 
into account the replacements in case of losses.
207
   
Hence, according to the model, I would categorize Taliban in the sub-variable leadership in 
the limited command structure level and responsiveness to internal leadership to semi-
responsive level thus making Taliban to qualify for the hybrid adversary range.  
5.2.3 State sponsors 
It was discussed earlier in chapter 3, while introducing the modified model of identifying a hy-
brid adversary that for an organization to ascend to the level of a hybrid adversary a critical 
factor in accomplishing that would be an external sponsor.  From the perspective of the mod-
el, two external sponsors of Taliban can be recognized, namely al-Qaeda and Pakistan.  Both 
parties have an interest in supporting Taliban.   
Al-Qaeda’s incentive to support Taliban can be seen to go back to their mutual relationship in 
the time of Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and in the future if Taliban was to return to power 
in Afghanistan it would create al-Qaeda a better environment to exist than there is at the mo-
ment, since there is no reason to believe Taliban would then turn a blind eye to al-Qaeda, be-
cause it has not done so in the past.
208
 
For Pakistan, Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and North Western Frontier Prov-
ince (NWFR) areas are turbulent and difficult to govern and to maintain security due to nu-
merous Taliban related (Pashtun) groups, which hold an overwhelming amount of sympathy 
for the cause of Taliban, which in turn makes it difficult for the Pakistani government to turn 
against Taliban.  Another aspect is that Pakistan recognizes that Taliban may indeed return to 
power at least in some parts of Afghanistan.  It will thus be beneficial for Pakistan to have 
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good relations with Taliban, which in turn serves as a countermeasure for the rising influence 
of India in Afghanistan.  India has provided the Karzai government in Kabul with financial 
aid, which has helped the Afghan people, but at the same time fueled regional tensions be-
tween India and Pakistan, whose relationship is already tense to begin with.
209
     
It is obvious that Pakistan supports Taliban at least indirectly by allowing Taliban to have 
sanctuaries both in FATA and in NWFP.  Since the Taliban regime was terminated in 2001 
these sanctuaries have been essential for the survival of Taliban, where it has had time to re-
cover, train and recruit new members to its organization.  These sanctuaries have provided 
shelter for Taliban leadership for over a decade and continue to do so, as well as a support ar-
ea that is virtually unaffected by the raids and operations compared those run by the interna-
tional coalition forces against Taliban leadership staged in Afghanistan.
210
  The much debated 
support of Taliban by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) can in a way be 
seen as a continuation of the support to the mujahedeen fighters against the Soviets Pakistan’s 
ISI, or its predecessor, was in charge of in the 1980’s.   Even though if that was not the case, 
the fact that Taliban leadership’s presence in Pakistani territory has been tolerated for over a 
decade suggests that sympathy from the part of Pakistan to the cause of Taliban exists.
211
   
Another interesting question is the role of al-Qaeda, an international terrorist organization that 
was openly provided with a safe haven by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan prior to the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.  The Taliban provided al-Qaeda with protection, shelter, re-
cruits, and both intellectual and social support network whereas al-Qaeda shared its wealth 
with Taliban and later sent its troops fighting along the side of Taliban against the Northern 
Alliance and the U.S.
212
  The relationship between these two organizations remain close, both 
retreated to Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and both established 
and still have sanctuaries in Pakistan.  They have had close ties; still exchange strategic in-
formation, and co-operate on the tactical level in Afghanistan.  Al-Qaeda has provided Tali-
ban with training and expertise in mounting sophisticated IED attacks based on their experi-
ences in Iraq.  From the point of view of Taliban propaganda, al-Qaeda is an ally, and they 
will be tolerated as long as they do not try to challenge Taliban’s power.213 
Based on the discussion above, I would categorize the responsiveness of Taliban to the aspira-
tions of these two parties as semi-responsive.  When combining it with the responsiveness to 
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internal leadership discussed earlier, the entire sub-variable categorizes in semi-responsive 
qualifying in the hybrid range. 
5.2.4 Strategy 
Taliban is driven by Deobandi Islam
214
, Pashtun village culture and the strict interpretation of 
the Islamic Law, although the interpretation of which is more flexible today than it was during 
the Taliban government in the past.  Since the overthrow from power Taliban has been con-
sistent with its statements that the only solution to the problems in Afghanistan (corruption, 
crime, and lack of security) is the re-establishment of Islamic regime in Kabul and the depar-
ture of infidel foreign troops.   It sees itself as the legitimate government of Afghanistan in ex-
ile and is waiting for a rightful return to power.  It claims it has no interests to use military 
power outside Afghanistan’s borders, thus making it a nationalistic movement for the benefit 
of all Afghan people.  Moreover, Afghan Taliban has not adopted the al-Qaeda jihadist agenda 
as such rather it has tried to distance itself from it, which cannot be said about the Pakistani 
Taliban.
215
  All in all, Taliban wants to create and to maintain a picture of the insurgency as a 
being a unified effort of all Afghans, an insurgency they are rightfully leading and in the end 
successfully re-establishing the Islamic state they once ruled in Afghanistan.  These messages 
are consistently repeated in the messages delivered both within and outside the organiza-
tion.
216
 
From the perspective of strategy, according to the model Taliban falls short of the hybrid 
range to the ideology range, but it is far beyond of an organization just focusing on making 
money or smuggling goods. 
5.3 Complex Terrain 
Terrain is the third core variable in the modified model of identifying a hybrid adversary.  As 
mentioned in chapter 3, it could be “a critical factor in determining whether a true hybrid ad-
versary can exist”.217  In case of Taliban it can be said that the terrain really works for the 
benefit of Taliban in Afghanistan – it has been so in the past and it will be so in the future.   
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5.3.1 Geographical Terrain  
As introduced earlier the geographical aspect of the model consists of high desert, flat farm-
lands, hills and villages, forests, hills, mountains and cities and then in the dartboard’s bull’s-
eye the mega cities.
218
  Afghanistan is a country in which the nature favors the insurgent.  By 
merely looking at the map (see Enclosure 9.4) one can see that number of those geographical 
conditions expressed in the model apply to Afghanistan from flatlands to high mountains. The 
distances are long and the transportation system along with communication system is under-
developed.  GEN Karl Eikenberry said in 2005 that “where the road ends, the Taliban begins” 
to demonstrate the point of poor transportation system of which less than one third were 
paved.  Since the downfall of Taliban, over 13,000 km of roads have been reconstructed by 
the international community with the emphasis on the 2,500 km ring road connecting major 
cities (Kabul – Kandahar – Herat – Mazar-i-Sharif – Kabul) and Afghanistan with its neigh-
boring countries.  Because the coalition forces must use the roads to move forces, equipment 
and supplies, the roads have been a limiting factor and easy ambush sites for the Taliban.  
Paving the roads has made it more difficult to carry out road side ambushes.  Terrain is rugged 
with mountains reaching up to over 6,000 m in the northeastern parts and to 5,000 m in the 
central parts of Afghanistan and flatter in the southern, western and northern parts.  The re-
stricted mountain terrain offers insurgent groups areas in which they can conceal their bases 
and protection at the same time since the high elevations limit the use of helicopters, in par-
ticular with maximum payloads.  Furthermore, the Afghan-Pakistani border is characterized 
by innumerable mountain passes that enable various insurgent groups to infiltrate to or retreat 
from the country.  These passages to and from Pakistan to support the insurgents have been 
successfully used ever since the invasion of Soviet Union in the1980’s.219   
It can surely be said that Taliban has taken advantage of the geographical conditions in its op-
erations against the coalition forces, as the Afghans always have done against an invader.  The 
fact that Taliban enjoys “home game” advantage gives it an upper hand against a foe. 
5.3.2 Human Terrain 
In this model, human terrain was divided into two categories: group dynamics and support of 
population.  By looking at the tribal distribution of Afghanistan in Enclosure 9.5 and the com-
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plexity of the Afghan tribal structure in the Enclosure 9.6 one can immediately say that the 
conflict in Afghanistan is far beyond a simple single cultural group conflict, but rather a mul-
tiple rival group or even intergroup conflict thus categorizing Taliban in the hybrid range.  
What makes Taliban different from Hezbollah is the complexity of the tribal society of Af-
ghanistan, and Pakistan.  The majority of the Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan are Pashtuns, 
but the Pashtun ethnic group is divided into two by the Afghan-Pakistani border (the Durand 
Line) leaving the majority in Pakistan.
220
 The Pashtuns are guided by their code of conduct 
and the way of life of the Pashtuns – namely the Pashtunwali.  Pashtunwali holds many myths 
and radiates the golden nostalgia of the past, but it actually evolves and differs over time and 
space.  Individuals have become of more importance at the expense of the collective interests.  
It is a complex and unwritten, but not a secret system transferred from generation to genera-
tion in the tribal assemblies.  For Pashtuns, the role of kinship is crucial.  It is a source of an 
individual identity.  In a Pashtun society the loyalties between relatives go all the way from 
the bottom (family) up to the level of a nation.  Loyalty is extended only when the particular 
level on the hierarchy pyramid is externally threatened.  For example, if some group of fami-
lies of one tribe would be in conflict (over e.g. water, land, forest) with another group of fami-
lies of the same tribe in a particular area, they would stick together and defend themselves 
with higher level of loyalty against an outside group.  This could in turn be brought all the 
way up to the national level as well, meaning that all Afghan ethnic groups could begin to co-
operate when threatened by an outside aggression.  This was the case with the Soviet occupa-
tion in the 1980’s, but is not the case in today’s Afghanistan, where Taliban has other compet-
itors for power as well.
221
  But even if just the Pashtuns unite against the externally (ISAF’s 
successor) supported central government of Afghanistan, the Taliban will be a substantial 
player in structuring Afghanistan for the second half of this decade. 
If we look at the support of the Afghan population to Taliban, we can conclude based on the 
previous chapter that initially Taliban were greeted with enthusiasm when they reached the 
power after the civil war, but after establishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and ruth-
lessly enforcing strict Islamic Law they lost the support of the people.  On the other hand, the 
fact that Taliban was able to create shadow governments in 31 provinces out of 34 between 
2005 and 2009 proves that it has support among the Afghan population based on their ability 
to provide “governmental” services, such as security, functional courts, collecting taxes, or 
just fear of the outcome of no-support provided that Taliban returns to power after ISAF’s 
termination in 2014.  Either way, Taliban has a strong hold of the Afghan population and it is 
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difficult to change that.  Yet it must not be disregarded that a number of minority groups resist 
Taliban and do not wish them to return to power.  Thus we cannot say that Taliban holds the 
support of the majority of the population, but has substantial support anyway. 
5.3.3 Cyberspace 
There is no evidence that Taliban possesses capabilities to take advantage of cyberspace as it 
is defined in the model.  Yet Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) does have its own internet 
pages that it uses to distribute information.
222
  It can be expected that Taliban, just as any or-
ganization of today, uses internet for information gathering and open source intelligence 
(OSINT) to support its ongoing and future operations, along with the mobile telephone net-
works, short message services (SMS) and e-mail at the tactical level.  The modified model of 
identifying a hybrid adversary approaches the core variable cyberspace from the perspective 
of threat that the organization being examined can inflict in this domain.  Taliban, being inca-
pable of posing that threat defined by the model, falls far behind and thus does not present it-
self as a hybrid adversary in this sub-variable now or unlikely will it do so in the near future. 
5.4 Summary 
Taliban has now been examined according to the modified model of identifying a hybrid ad-
versary.  As a result, according to the model, Taliban does not qualify as a truly hybrid adver-
sary, yet it mostly falls in the semi-hybrid range (see Figure 4).  This means that it possess 
qualities associated with hybrid adversaries that make it from the threat level perspective not 
to be underestimated.  Taliban fulfills two out of the three critical factors (external state spon-
sor, complex terrain and standoff weapons) in developing into a hybrid adversary.  It has a 
state sponsor (Pakistan), limited yes, but still it has one (or two if we count al-Qaeda).  The 
complex terrain undeniably favors Taliban.  The only sub-variable it falls short of being hy-
brid in this core variable is cyberspace.  That can be disregarded, since in the Afghan society 
cyberspace does not play such a huge role as it does in western societies, so it is no wonder 
that it really plays no significant role for Taliban either.  The third critical factor is standoff 
weapon(s) in the capability core variable, in which Taliban fell below the hybrid range due to 
the lack of these standoff weapons.  If this shortfall was to change, it would quickly bring Tal-
iban to the hybrid range in this entity and place it into the hybrid adversary range in the entire 
model making it even more of a party not to be disregarded in the future negotiations of Af-
ghanistan.  This change could be brought about with Taliban gaining access to for example 
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MANPADS, as happened with the mujahedeen fighters with Stinger missiles and the Soviets 
in the 1980’s. 
 
Figure 4: Taliban and the modified model of identifying a hybrid adversary. 
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6 ANALYSIS  
This chapter is divided in two parts.  First are discussed the similarities and differences of 
Hezbollah and Taliban, that were brought about during the process of using this model to 
study these two organizations, then the modified model of identifying a hybrid adversary and 
its applicability to Taliban or other organizations.  Second are presented some observations 
and shortcomings regarding the model, which were made during the process of writing this 
thesis.    
6.1 Identification of a Hybrid Adversary 
Hezbollah and Taliban have a similar background in many ways besides the fact that they are 
considered terrorist organizations by the west. Both were born as a result of the developments 
in their respective areas of influence due to discontent in the current events taking place - the 
Lebanese Civil War and Israeli campaigns of 1978 and 1982 with Hezbollah and the Soviet 
occupation and Afghan civil war with Taliban.  Both were initially (and are) supported by an 
external sponsor – Hezbollah by Iran and Syria, and Taliban by Pakistani ISI.  Interestingly 
enough both have survived the events that gave birth to them and others as well, Hezbollah 
reaching the age of 32 years and Taliban 19 years this year.  Although Hezbollah started as a 
global terrorist organization both are currently regional organizations with no aspirations to 
extend their influence beyond their own area of operations.  However, this has been the case 
with Hezbollah until this year.  The reports of Hezbollah’s militants participating in the Syrian 
civil war supporting the Assad regime is a sign of Hezbollah looking beyond its borders.  The 
level of Iranian influence on Hezbollah to support Assad’s regime can be estimated high, and 
thus Hezbollah’s role as an Iranian proxy continues.  Hezbollah’s military support of Assad’s 
regime can also be seen as a natural course of action, since Syria has supported Hezbollah 
over the years extensively.  In this case, Hezbollah operates as a loyal partner to its sponsors, 
both Iran and Syria, and proving the relationship is reciprocal.  One could also argue that 
“friends help friends when they are in need”, and Assad’s regime is in need this time and 
Hezbollah is acting as “friends” do.  In order to maintain this beneficial relationship between 
its state sponsors, Hezbollah really has no other option than to side with Assad. 
Both Hezbollan and Taliban are "states-within-states" in their respective areas.  Both fulfill 
the gap left by non-existent services provided by the local government within their respective 
regions.  The services delivered by Hezbollah to both Shias and non-Shias have won the 
"hearts and minds" of the population in southern Lebanon.  In Afghanistan the Taliban estab-
lished shadow government structures and the services they provide are limited to law-and-
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order and religious guidance – limited, but more than Karzai government is capable of provid-
ing.  This in turn helps to win the support of local population expecting someone to provide 
these services, although some give the support out of fear of repercussions of not doing so if 
Taliban ever returns to power in the future. 
As seen in Enclosure 9.7, it appears that Taliban, similar to Hezbollah, is reaching a limited 
"victory" at roughly at the age of 20 years, namely the termination of ISAF operation.  The Is-
rael’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 could be seen from the Hezbollah's part as a 
"victory" and the beginning of an essential period of development on the route to reach the 
hybrid adversary level it demonstrated against Israel in the 2006 war.  This period in between 
2000 and 2006 allowed Hezbollah to develop its organization, military capabilities and re-
shape the terrain to its advantage.  It remains interesting to see the development of Taliban 
and the situation in Afghanistan after the end of ISAF and during its successor.  Whether Tal-
iban will use the time after ISAF ends to develop itself, or try to reestablish the Islamic Emir-
ate of Afghanistan (IEA) as it has systematically claimed its ultimate goal to be, remains to be 
seen.   
There are some fundamental differences of these two organizations that need to be addressed.   
First, it can be said that the maturity of Hezbollah, in the sense represented in the model, is 
much more developed compared to Taliban.  It is as an older organization, and its maturing 
process has followed a gradually upward sloping development curve beginning from a terror-
ist organization, being the only militia, participation in politics, development of military pow-
er, stabilizing its position.  Taliban’s curve, on the other hand, shot right up from a popular 
movement to the ruling of a nation to plummet after its overthrow of power, to gradually 
begin rise upwards again.  Taliban began as a local popular movement in Kandahar and in two 
years it was ruling the entire Afghanistan having established the Islamic Emirate of Afghani-
stan (IEA).  It was too early, Taliban was not mature enough to take that sort of responsibility, 
whereas Hezbollah spent the first 15 years being a terrorist organization and participated for 
the first time in Lebanese elections 10 years from its birth.  The participation in elections 
combined with functional social programs has given Hezbollah legitimacy in the eyes of the 
local population, whereas Taliban lacks this legitimacy – it has done nothing to improve the 
well-being and quality of life of the Afghan people, neither during their regime nor after, ra-
ther the opposite.  Taliban has formed functional shadow governments, but it has used brute 
force of fear to gain power or influence in the area, it has not subjected itself to the electoral 
process – to have the people choose them to govern.  The support of the local population is 
based on fear of consequences of not supporting provided that Taliban return to power.   
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The second difference between these two organizations is the level of state sponsorship.  As 
discussed earlier, the support Hezbollah has received over the years from Iran and Syria is 
substantial and without it Hezbollah could never have developed into such an organization 
and regional player it is today.  Hezbollah has been responsive to the wishes and demands of 
its sponsors, making it a trustworthy investment, thus it has secured the flow of funding and 
military equipment, eventually even sophisticated weapons.  Hezbollah has recognized that it 
works both ways, if it abides by the wishes of its sponsors, the support will continue - and it 
has - whilst Taliban has remained an unreliable investment from the perspective of Pakistan, 
its sponsor.  Until Taliban demonstrates reliability and adequate responsiveness from the Pa-
kistani point of view, the sponsorship will remain in the very limited level.  This lack of re-
sponsiveness can be seen to hinder the development of Taliban. 
The third difference is the existence of other militia organizations within their region of influ-
ence.  In the aftermath of the Taif Accord (1989), which officially ended the Lebanese Civil 
War, Hezbollah was recognized as the only existing militia in Lebanon.  The other militias 
taking part in the civil war were disarmed.  As a result, Hezbollah had no competition and 
didn't have to waste resources to compete with other groups, but rather gave it a chance to fo-
cus on its own development.  In Afghanistan, Taliban is facing a number of other armed 
groups or networks competing for power.  Some may be in a thin alliance with it, subject to 
change provided that the circumstances change, and some are just outright against Taliban.  
This forces Taliban to take these other parties into account at least to some extent and not al-
low it to focus all the energy on its own development.  It is hardly a possibility in Afghanistan 
that other competing networks would or could be disarmed besides Taliban leaving it as the 
sole armed organization to evolve.  
The fourth difference is the religion, which curiously enough is a similarity as well.  Both 
Hezbollah and Taliban are organizations heavily influenced by Islam, although they represent 
different sects of Islam – Hezbollah being Shia and Taliban being Sunni.  Their interpretation 
of Islam could be described from the western perspective as extreme, since Hezbollah draws 
its inspiration from the Iranian revolution and Taliban from the Deobandi Islam.  The fact that 
religious ideology plays an integral role in both organizations makes them a dangerous adver-
sary that cannot be suppressed by military means only, but rather it will just fuel the resistance 
as have been seen with both Hezbollah and Taliban.  This is something not to be forgotten 
when dealing with these kinds of organizations.  
In this thesis a model, originally introduced by MAJ BOWERS (US ARMY), was displayed 
according to which any organization could be examined to determine whether it is or, provid-
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ed that correct circumstances prevailed, could develop into a hybrid adversary – an adversary 
that could pose a challenge to any western military in a given conflict.  The original model 
was reshaped and made more descriptive and measurable.   Hezbollah was used to substanti-
ate the modified model, and then in previous chapter it was tested with Taliban.  With both, 
Hezbollah and Taliban the model worked.  Hezbollah categorized in the true hybrid adversary 
range and Taliban fell just short of qualifying a hybrid adversary, yet as we know, both have 
been capable and respectable adversaries in their own area of operation for their western coun-
terparts, namely Israel and the international coalition forces in Afghanistan and the United 
States.  The placement of Hezbollah and Taliban with respect to the model can be seen in Fig-
ure 5.  
This result was no surprise, especially with Hezbollah.  As mentioned earlier, Hezbollah af-
fected the creation of the model by MAJ Bowers heavily, thus it can be expected to score well 
on each of the measured entities.  The other reason is that Hezbollah really is the best example 
of a hybrid adversary as of now due to the military capacity demonstrated in the Second Leb-
anon War.  Taliban, on the other hand, fell short of being a hybrid adversary in one of the 
core variables, namely weapon, and thus it was not categorized as a hybrid adversary.  It fell 
behind Hezbollah in practically every entity measured.  Moreover, it is important to realize 
Taliban fell short of being a hybrid adversary as of now due to the level it reached in the 
weapon sub-variable, but over the years it has demonstrated capabilities that would qualify it 
one step higher on this entity and organization which in turn would make it qualify for the hy-
brid adversary range.  This also proves the point that it is possible to move up and down in 
the model due to changing circumstances.  Had Taliban been studied according to the model 
back in 2006 while fighting the coalition forces in Kandahar during Operation Medusa, it 
would have qualified as a hybrid adversary.  This is demonstrated on Figure 5 with the dotted 
line. 
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Figure 5: Hezbollah and Taliban in the modified model of identifying hybrid adversary 
 
 
These results concur with the experiences of international coalition forces in Afghanistan.  
The fight against Taliban has ranged from full scale conventional warfare to counterinsurgen-
cy (COIN) to support to the Afghan Security Forces (ASF), it has not been "a ride in the park",  
instead complicated and rather costly, and regardless of the actions of the coalition forces, 
Taliban has always found a way to continue existence and influence in Afghanistan.  The 
model points out that with few developments, such as acquisition of standoff weapons, Tali-
ban could even increase its hybrid adversary level significantly and thus become even bigger 
of a threat or more of a hybrid adversary - in a sense a more significant player with military 
capability in the political negotiations of the future development of Afghanistan. 
The critical factors (standoff weapons, external state sponsor, and complex terrain) brought 
up as preconditions to rise to the level of a hybrid adversary proved valid.  Hezbollah has all 
three accounted for and has used them efficiently – ATGMs, land-sea missiles, rockets, 
UAVs; substantial support from Syria and Iran; complex terrain of Southern Lebanon with 
substantial reshaping to improve its defenses.  Taliban has the complex terrain and it certainly 
uses it for its advantage, but the sponsorship from Pakistan is limited to sanctuaries, roughly 
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speaking, and is no match to the support Hezbollah is receiving from Iran or Syria.  Pakistan, 
at least until now, has not supported Taliban to the extent we’ve seen Iran and Syria support 
Hezbollah.  It has not supplied Taliban with standoff weapons, and training, in large quantities 
that would be needed to increase Taliban’s capabilities to raise it to the next level.  As much 
of an interest for Pakistan it is to see Taliban exist as a balancing factor for the increasing in-
fluence of India in the region, Taliban does not produce large enough of a dividend to the in-
vestment to do so.  In terms of the model, this has to do with the responsiveness to external 
state sponsor.  It can be interpreted from the model that Taliban is seen from the Pakistani 
point of view as an erratic organization and the actions of such organization may be difficult 
to predict and can even turn against supporter.  Thus it is not being worth investing in Taliban 
in such volume and give them access to state of the art weaponry, which in the worst case sce-
nario could be used against itself.  As far as al-Qaeda is concerned, it is not really that potent 
of a sponsor to be considered as an external state sponsor, but rather a group that aids Taliban 
from time to time with training, equipment and strategy.  It remains to be seen whether Hez-
bollah’s activities in the Syrian civil war will have an effect on its capacity as a hybrid adver-
sary or not, since according to the model, an organization extending its influence beyond its 
area of influence may result the loss of the edge given by the complex terrain, currently work-
ing for the advantage of both Hezbollah and Taliban. 
ISAF coming to an end in 2014 and its successor yet undefined, it remains to be seen what 
sort of development will take place in Afghanistan and with Taliban as well.  Hezbollah began 
after its teen years to focus more on its own development as a political and military player in 
southern Lebanon and now in its early thirties it has established its position and is to be taken 
into account in the decision making process of the region.  However, Taliban, at the beginning 
of its twenties, faces the situation where it has to decide either to sit down in the negotiation 
table with various counterparts and mitigate its own objectives and try to reach a political set-
tlement of some sort, or to continue its insurgency against the current government and other 
parties.  The latter option will not result in a solution in the region, but rather bring about a 
civil war in Afghanistan. 
6.2 Shortcomings  
In the process of writing this thesis and working with the model some observations and short-
comings of the model emerged that should be noted and taken into account, when evaluating 
the results given by the model.  These were the roles of cyberspace, finance, time, the availa-
87 
 
bility of multiple standoff weapons and the unique tribal aspect in Afghanistan.  These sub-
jects are next discussed more in detail. 
The role of cyberspace turned out to be unimportant in the examination of Hezbollah and Tal-
iban with respect to the model, yet it is a domain of utmost importance to the western world.  
There are several reasons for this.  First, as mentioned earlier, cyberspace as defined plays no 
significant role in the life of Taliban and it is in that sense reasonable for their part not to 
spend resources in that domain.  Hezbollah on the other hand, could have use for capabilities 
in the cyberspace, but has not demonstrated that capability – yet.  The expertise and resources 
to become effective in cyberspace requires time, continuous and active research and develop-
ment, and financial resources.  Perhaps Hezbollah has not reached that level yet, namely it is 
not mature enough in that sense or perhaps it has no interest in developing in that domain.  It 
could be expected to do so, but when it would reach the level to actively engage in cyberspace 
is only to be guessed.  Second, the criteria for climbing up the stairs of cyberspace in the 
model presented in this thesis could be set wrong.  When setting the criteria for the model, the 
cyberspace the most difficult to come up with the definitions for different levels, and eventu-
ally the approach from the threat perspective was taken rather than focusing on individual 
skills, events, or capabilities in different levels.  Yet before judging the criteria is false, an or-
ganization with known capabilities in cyberspace should be examined first according to this 
model and see whether the criteria works or not, and then make the necessary adjustments. 
The second observation about the functionality of the model was that the model does not take 
into account the financing aspect.  It is an imperative for any organization, from national ar-
mies to insurgent groups to criminal gangs to have the financing on solid ground.  Continuous 
flow of funds has to be secured or the operations will cease.  The model disregards both Hez-
bollah’s and Taliban’s methods acquiring funding for their operations.  However, finance is 
indirectly taken into account in the sub-variables sustainability and responsiveness to sponsor.  
In both of these sub-variables the financing is sort of built in; to sustain capabilities financial 
resources must be in order and if a state sponsor is happy and the support is being received, 
then the finance issue must be in order too.  In my opinion, this aspect of finance should be 
added to the model, because it could open an avenue of effect, either hindering or expediting 
the development of an organization of becoming a hybrid adversary.  
Third, the model does not fully account for the concept of time.  It is discussed some in the 
core variable maturity, but I am not discussing now the time in the sense meant in that core 
variable, but rather as actual physical time.  In the case of Taliban, I came across the following 
statement made by a Taliban propagandist:  “The Americans have the clock, but we have the 
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time.”  This describes the problem at hand with the model; it does not take into account the 
physical time.  On the other hand, this was the case when examining Taliban, an organization 
currently a part of an ongoing conflict, but did not appear as strongly with Hezbollah.  If the 
model is used for estimating the threat level posed by an organization in general, it may not be 
of importance, but for any force commander upon entering an area of operation (AOO), it 
could be of value to have an estimate of the effect of time (days, weeks, months and years) on 
the organization about to be faced.  However, as of now, the model lacks this aspect and it is 
just something to keep in mind while using the model. 
Fourth, the model does not take into account the availability of multiple standoff weapons 
possessed by the group being examined.  As known, Hezbollah has multiple weapons catego-
rized in the model as standoff weapons, such as anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), long-, 
medium- and short range missiles, anti-ship missiles etc.  It has solved the question of sus-
tainability and training, and making them a credible capability according to the model.  This 
feature is not taken into account in the model.  There is neither “capability multiplier” nor a 
mechanism other than the human evaluation of the intelligence officer using the model to ex-
amine the organization.  The weapon sector in the model could be divided and a “number” of 
standoff weapons added starting from 1 in the outer perimeter and continuing all the way to 5 
or 6 or so, as was done in the organization & cohesion and the operating unit size.  It would 
seem a bit artificial, but perhaps functional.  At least it would give an idea of a potential num-
ber of standoff weapons, but which ones were capabilities and not just events, would require 
each one to be examined individually.  Nonetheless, the role of the intelligence officer is cru-
cial in determining the level of hybridity of an organization, and if that estimation is left for 
the intelligence officer, regardless of the number of standoff weapons available, it shouldn’t 
pose a problem. 
Last, when examining Taliban according to the model, it was difficult to deal with the unique 
tribal structure of Afghanistan and Taliban.  Although Taliban consists primarily of Pashtuns, 
it includes other ethnic groups as well, through bloodlines and just out of mutually beneficial 
alliances.  This tribal structure with changing nature of alliances is obviously handled in the 
sub-variable human terrain, but the way the Afghan tribes may unite against a foreign invader 
(experiences of the British and Soviets), ignoring the ethnic lines or existing disputes, almost 
makes it an uncontrollable weapon of some kind.  Provided that this unification happened in 
Afghanistan it could almost be counted as equivalent of a standoff weapon – a critical factor 
of the model.  It can be discussed whether it has happened in Afghanistan or not, at least Tali-
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ban has been capable of establishing shadow governments and made its return credible in the 
eyes of the local people in Afghanistan. 
There are recognized shortcomings of the model, and it could be more accurate in some as-
pect, but overall I believe it is adequate for the purpose it is intended for, namely identifying 
hybrid adversaries or those on the route to become one.  To make it more reliable and applica-
ble to other organizations, more research should be done examining other organizations and 
groups according to the model, see whether the model holds as is and if it does not, then make 
the necessary changes to further develop it. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
The model that was introduced in this thesis proved a functional tool in estimating the threat 
level posed by the Hezbollah and Afghan Taliban.  The primary research question of this the-
sis was that does Taliban fulfill the requirements of a hybrid adversary or is it likely to be-
come one according to the modified model of identifying a hybrid adversary?  Taliban fell 
short of being identified as a hybrid adversary, but according to the model could easily move 
up the ladder to qualify as one provided that it gained access to standoff weapons.  The evolu-
tion of these two organizations differs from each other, but yet has some similarities.  The 
biggest differences between the two are the fact that Taliban ended up governing the entire 
Afghanistan prematurely just two years after the events giving birth to it, and the level of state 
sponsor ship being received by Hezbollah compared to Taliban due to the responsiveness of 
the former to the demands of the state sponsor.  Two biggest similarities of these organiza-
tions are their remarkable capability to survive and become “states-within-states.  Both have 
survived conflicts that gave birth to them and in particular the numerous countermeasures of 
their adversaries.  Both have become a “state-within-state” in their area of interest regardless 
of the existing governments’ actions.  All of these similarities and differences are important 
factors when identifying a hybrid adversary.   The model introduced in this thesis makes all of 
them measurable and visually seen in one picture.   
It can also be said that the modified model originally represented by MAJ Christopher O. 
Bowers (US ARMY) worked with Taliban.  Yet there were some shortcomings that the model 
did not take into account, but it did not affect the outcome of the results.  The critical factors 
(standoff weapons, external state sponsor, and complex terrain) proved valid when examining 
Hezbollah and Taliban. However, with Taliban’s the sheer volume of the annual use of im-
provised explosive devices (IEDs) raised a question whether it would qualify for the hybrid 
range, but according to the model, it didn’t.   
One domain was left more or less untouched in this thesis – cyberspace.  It is the domain of 
anonymity, not restricted by location, rather accessible anywhere around the world, with infi-
nite possibilities to effect and influence individuals and nations so dependent on information 
technology (IT).  Although it did not fully fit as it was defined in the model presented in this 
thesis, an organization mainly operating in cyberspace could be examined according to the 
model.  In that case the emphasis could be placed differently, and as a result the capabilities 
demonstrated in that domain could offset the importance of other critical factors presented in 
the model.  Moreover, whereas a war of today most likely leads to the destruction of physical 
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targets by kinetic weapons, a war of the future in cyberspace may leave those targets physical-
ly unharmed, but specific or all programs associated with those targets shut down, wiped out 
or destroyed, thus leaving them subjected to reloading of new programs and putting them back 
into service in the reconstruction phase after the war.  Regardless of these notions, I conclude 
that the model works and to improve it, more testing with different types of organizations and 
groups should be carried out using it before those shortcomings should be factored in.   
The results of this thesis can be seen in two ways.  First, the threat level of Hezbollah and Tal-
iban was estimated according to the model – former qualified as a hybrid adversary and the 
latter didn’t.  Second, more importantly, the modified model presented in this thesis worked.  
It is a tool that puts “meat around the bones” of the “hybrid threat” concept introduced in the 
US ARMY FM 3-0: Operations (Change 1), otherwise so difficult to grasp.  Any intelligence 
officer preparing intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) prior to deployment could 
use this model while mapping the potential adversaries within the area of operation (AOO).  
He could quickly estimate the threat level posed by the local groups, categorize those that 
could pose a real threat and need more research.  In a time sensitive situation this could guide 
the use of time to focus on the important groups and organizations rather than equally distrib-
uting the time available between all groups identified.  A group with anti-tank guided missiles 
(ATGMs), operating in mountainous terrain and having a state sponsor would require more at-
tention than a group armed with small arms focusing on making money.  Those categorized as 
hybrid adversaries would most likely have a greater overall military capacity and thus pose a 
greater threat to the force eventually deployed to the AOO.  As a force commander, I would be 
particularly interested in those adversaries possessing substantial military capacity and catego-
rizing by any standards as hybrid.  In the larger scheme the model could be used by any party 
to identify and monitor specific organizations being or becoming in the hybrid adversary 
range and determine the factors required to either hinder or expedite the development depend-
ing on the interests of the party in question.   
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